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I. INTRODUCTION
Many federal causes of action do not have express statutes of limi-
tations. For years lawyers, judges, and legal scholars have criticized
the method by which limitations periods are determined for these
claims.1 Traditionally, the courts have borrowed the most analogous
state statute of limitations unless applying state law would conflict
with federal law or policy.2 When a conflict occurs, the courts borrow
the most analogous federal statute of limitations.3 Determining which
state or federal limitations period is, in fact, the most analogous is
often extremely difficult. As a result, borrowing has led to confusion,
lack of uniformity, inequitable administration of federal rights, unfair
surprise to litigants, and unnecessary waste of judicial time and
resources.4
Congress attempted to address this problem in the Judicial Im-
provements Act of 1990.5 Section 3136 created a four-year general stat-
ute of limitations for federal statutory actions which do not have
1. See, e.g., Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1393-94 (7th Cir.
1990)(Posner, J., concurring)('"Borrowing a period of limitations from one statute
to use with another that doesn't have its own limitations provision is a matter of
which round peg to stuff in a square hole."), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2887 (1991);
Rick Marcus, Memorandum to the Workload Subcommittee on Providing Fed-
eral Limitations Periods for All Federal Claims, in 1 FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
CoMMrurEE WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMnMTrEE REPORTS JULY 1, 1990, REPORT
OF THE SUBCODITIEE ON WORKLOAD, pt. V, at 12 [hereinafter Marcus, Memo-
randum]("' jhere appears to be no signijfcant support for perpetuating the cur-
rent borrowing regime."); REPORT OF THE COMMERCIAL AND FEDERAL LITIGATION
SECTION OF THE NEw YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION ON THE APPLICATION OF
STATUTF OF LIMITATIONS IN FEDERAL LITIGATION, in 1 FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMITEE WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOUMMTrEE, REPORTS JULY 1, 1990, RE-
PORT OF THE SUBCOMIITTEE ON WORKLOAD, pt. V, at 1, reprinted in 53 ALB. L.
REv. 3 (1988)[hereinafter NYSBA REPORT]; David D. Siegel, Practice Commen-
tary on Amendment of Federal Rule 4 (Ef. Feb. 26, 1983) with Special Statute of
Limitations Precautions, 96 F.RD. 88, 97-100 (1983)[hereinafter Siegel, Practice
Commentary]; Mitchell A. Lowenthal et al., Special Project, Time Bars in Spe-
cialized Federal Common Law: Federal Rights of Action and State Statutes of
Limitations, 65 CORNELL L. REv. 1011, 1072-78, 1105 (1980)[hereinafter Special
Project]. See also Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S.
143, 157-70 (1987)(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
2. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985); DelCostello v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 171 (1983).
3. DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 172 (1983).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 104-210, 243-73.
5. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990). The Judicial Improvements Act was
enacted on December 1, 1990.
6. The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 contains four titles. Section 313 is part of
Title Ill, the Federal Courts Study Committee Implementations Act of 1990, Pub.




explicit limitations periods. 7 However, the new "fallback" statute of
limitations applies only to civil actions arising under federal statutes
enacted after December 1, 1990.8 It does not apply to federal legisla-
tion enacted on or before December 1, 1990, federal common law, or
implied rights of action arising under federal law.9 For the foresee-
able future, most federal claims not governed by explicit limitations
periods will arise under statutes enacted before December 1, 1990. Be-
cause section 313 only applies prospectively, the equitable and practi-
cal problems which borrowing creates will continue to plague the bar
and bench.
Part II of this article discusses statutes of limitations and the poli-
cies they serve. Part III examines the problems created by borrowing
analagous limitations periods. Part IV traces the legislative history of
section 313. Part V examines the federal "fallback" statute of limita-
tions and the problems it does not address. Based on this analysis, the
article concludes that section 313 does not adequately address the
problems of borrowing limitations periods and may actually delay
adoption of a comprehensive solution.
In lieu of the current scheme, Congress should enact a general stat-
ute of limitations for all federal causes of action without explicit peri-
ods of limitations which accrue after the statute is enacted. A
"fallback" limitations period for both existing and new federal causes
of action would avoid the uncertainty and inequity of borrowing with-
out unduly prejudicing potential litigants. Restricting its application
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (Supp. 1991).
8. Section 313(a) provides in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided by law, a civil action arising under an
Act of Congress enacted after the date of the enactment of this section
(Dec. 1, 1990) may not be commenced later than 4 years after the cause
of action accrues.
28 U.S.C. § 1658 (Supp. 1991)(emphasis added).
Interestingly, § 313(c), which specifies the effective date of § 313(a), appears to
conflict with § 313(a). Section 313(c) provides, "The amendments made by this
section [§ 313] shall apply with respect to causes of action accruing on or after the
date of the enactment of this Act (Dec. 1, 1990)." Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. at
5115 (emphasis added). The NEW YORK STATE LAW DIGEST suggests that § 313(c)
is "just careless boilerplate that should be subordinated to the crux of the stat-
ute's intention .... " Significant Changes in Federal Jurisdiction and Practice
Part III-The "New" Federal Statute of Limitations, N.Y. ST. L. DIG., Apr. 1991, at
1, 2 (David D. Siegel ed.). Although the wording of § 313(c) may be an oversight,
§ 313(a) and (c) are not necessarily inconsistent. Congress may pass statutes after
December 1, 1990, which apply retroactively. Under § 313(c) the four-year gen-
eral limitations period would only apply to those actions arising under such stat-
utes which accrued on or after December 1, 1990.
9. The language of § 313 precludes causes of action implied under federal statutes
enacted on or before December 1, 1990. It is unclear whether § 313 extends to
implied causes of action arising under federal statutes enacted after December 1,
1991. See infra text accompanying notes 328-30.
[V ol. 72:454
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to claims accruing after the enactment of the "fallback" statute would
also prevent unfair surprise to those relying on past law.
H. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
A. The Nature of Limitations Periods
Statutes of limitations measure the time within which a litigant
must assert his or her claim.10 They are measured from the date on
which the claim accrues."Z If the plaintiff fails to commence the action
before the statute of limitations has run, his or her right to relief is
lost. 2
10. Statutes of limitations are not the only time limitations which affect rights of
action. Common law time-bars, such as laches, may also bar claims. See Special
Project, supra note 1, at 1014-15.
11. The accrual date will vary depending on the type of action. For example, tort
actions are generally measured from the date of injury while contract actions are
measured from the date of breach. See RFsrATELiENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 899
(1977); 18 SAIMUL WIISTON & WALTER H.E. JAEGER, A TREATisE ON THE LAW
OF CONTRACTS § 2021A (3d ed. 1978). Although case law usually determines
when a given cause of action arises, the statute which creates the right of action
may specify the accrual date. See, eg., N.Y. U.C.C. LAw § 2-725(2)(McKinney
1964) ("A cause of action [for breach of contract for a sale of goods] accrues when
the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the
breach."); Title VH of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(e)(1988)[hereinafter Title VIII(providing that a complainant must file a charge
with the EEOC within 180 days, 300 days in a deferral state, "after the alleged
unlawful employment practice occurred").
Determining the accrual date may cause considerable problems in determin-
ing whether the statute of limitations for a particular claim has run. For exam-
ple, the courts still struggle with the issue of when employment discrimination
claims arise under Title VII even though Title VII specifies an accrual date. See
Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989)(holding that the date of
accrual for challenging an intentionally discriminatory seniority system was the
date on which the seniority plan was adopted even though the plaintiffs were not
affected until years later). Section 112 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(e)(2)(Supp. 1991), legislatively overrules Lorance on its particular facts
but leaves open the question of whether decisions extending Lorance to nonse-
nority cases survive. See also Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986)(holding
that a claim arose each time the plaintiff received a discriminatory paycheck);
United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977)(holding that the plaintiff's
claim arose when she was illegally discharged, not when she was rehired without
seniority); Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980)(holding that the
plaintiff's claim arose when the defendant notified the plaintiff that he had been
denied tenure, not on his last day of employment). See generally James M.
Fischer, The Limits of Statutes of Limitation, 16 Sw. U. L. REV. 1, 3-8 (1986).
12. The rules governing when a cause of action commences for purposes of tolling the
statute of limitations vary. In many jurisdictions filing the complaint with the
court is sufficient. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 3 (providing that federal law claims
are commenced for statute of limitations purposes by filing the complaint; diver-
sity claims are governed by state law.) Some states require service of the sum-
mons, complaint, or both. See N.Y. Cirv. PRAC. L. &. R. 203(b)(1)(McKinney
1990); KAI. STAT. ANN. § 61-1703 (Supp. 1991). Special rules may govern particu-
1993]
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The states have enacted generalized statutes of limitations.13
These statutes provide time-bars for common groups or categories of
actions.14 For example, a state might enact a six-year limitation on
actions arising under a contract 5 or a three-year limitation on actions
to recover damages for personal injury.16 Other state statutes provide
explicit limitations periods for the rights that they create.17 Many
states also have a "catch-all" or "fallback" statute of limitations for
claims that do not have an explicit limitations period and do not fall
within a generalized statute.' 8
Other factors may affect how statutes of limitations are measured.
These include tolling provisions, conditions precedent to filing a claim,
and provisions for borrowing other periods of limitations. The rules
governing these factors are found in state legislation19 as well as case
law.
Unlike the state legislatures, Congress has not enacted generalized
periods of limitations for federal causes of action.20 While some fed-
lar causes of action or circumstances. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act
§ 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b)(1988)(requiring both filing and service of process); N.Y.
Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 203(b)(5)(McKinney 1990)(providing that service on the
county sheriff tolls the statute of limitations for 60 days to allow additional time
for serving the defendant.)
13. All fifty states have adopted generalized statutes of limitations. Special Project,
supra note 1, at 1015 n.13. See, e.g., N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 211-217 (McKinney
1990 & Supp. 1993).
14. For a discussion on how generalized statutes of limitations work, see Donna A.
Boswell, Comment, The Parameters of Federal Common Law: The Case of Time
Limitations on Federal Causes of Action, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1447, 1461-63 (1988);
See generally CALIviN W. CORMAN, LIMITATION OF ACTIONS (1991).
15. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 213(2)(McKinney 1990).
16. See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 214(5)(McKinney 1990).
17. See, e.g., N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 2-725 (McKinney 1964)(establishing a four-year stat-
ute of limitations for breach of contract for sale of goods); 43 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 959(h)(1991)(requiring a complaint under the Human Relations Act to be
filed with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission "within one hundred
and eighty days after the alleged act of discrimination").
18. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5527 (1981 & Supp. 1993)("Any civil action or
proceeding which is neither subject to another limitation specified in this sub-
chapter nor excluded from the application of a period of limitation by section
5531" must be commenced within six years.); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 213(1)(Mc-
Kinney 1990)(establishing a six-year statute of limitations for "an action for
which no limitation is specifically prescribed by law"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-4
(Michie 1990)("[A]ll other actions not herein otherwise provided for and specified
[must be brought] within four years.").
19. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAW §§ 50-e, 50-i (McKinney 1986)(providing that notice
of a tort claim against a municipality must be given within 90 days after the claim
arises.); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 208 (McKinney 1990)(tolling provision for in-
fancy and insanity); N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. 204(b)(McKinney 1990)(tolling dur-
ing non-mandatory arbitrations); N.Y. CIv. PRAc. L. & R. 202 (McKinney
1990)(borrowing statutes of limitations for causes of action accruing out-of-state).
See generally Special Project, supra note 1, at 1015 n.13.
20. Some exceptions exist. Congress has adopted a five-year statute of limitations for
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eral statutes have explicit time-bars for the rights they create, 21 many
do not.22 When a federal claim has no explicit limitations period, the
courts must "fill in the gap" usually by borrowing an appropriate state
statute of limitations.23
Statutes of limitations are not jurisdictional in nature.24 They are
subject to equitable tolling and waiver. At common law statutes of
limitations were considered affirmative defenses, affecting the plain-
tiff's remedy but not the underlying right.2z The same is true for the
states' general limitations provisions. 26 However, where a state stat-
ute creates a right and specifies a limitations period for enforcing that
right, the statute of limitations may be considered a substantive condi-
tion measuring the life of the right.27 The plaintiff then has the bur-
"enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture." 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1988).
However, the courts have interpreted this provision narrowly. Special Project,
supra note 1, at 1023 n.65. Congress has also enacted a five-year "fall-back" stat-
ute of limitations for non-capital criminal actions. 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1988). See
also 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a)(1988)(establishing a six-year statute of limitations for
nontort actions against the United States).
21. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C § 15b (1988)(four-year statute of limitations for civil enforce-
ment actions under the Clayton Act); 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)(1988)(two-year statute of
limitations for insider trading claims under the Securities Exchange Act); 35
U.S.C. § 286 (1988)(six-year statute of limitations for patent infringement claims);
29 U.S.C § 160(b)(1988)(six-month statute of limitations for filing unfair labor
practice charges with the National Labor Relations Board). For a compilation of
federal statutes of limitations, see Federal Statutes of Limitation, 20 Sw. U. L.
REV. 494 (1991) (listing statutes of limitations for federal statutory causes of action
and other procedural time limitations).
22. See ag., 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1988)(RICO civil enforcement actions); 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(e)(2)(1988)(parental challenges to administrative rulings under the All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975); 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988)(actions against employ-
ers for breach of collective bargaining agreements under the National Labor Re-
lations Act); 29 U.S.C. §§ 411, 412 (1988)(claims under the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 for violations of the Union Bill of Rights);
33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988)(citizen enforcement actions under the Clean Water Act);
42 U.S.C § 1981 (1988)(actions for discrimination in the making and enforcement
of contracts); 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. 1991)(damages actions for intentional dis-
crimination under Title VII or the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990); 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) (civil rights actions against persons acting under color of state
law); 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (Supp. 1991)(citizen enforcement actions under the Clean
Air Act).
23. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985). The courts will occasionally borrow
a federal statute of limitations if applying state law would conflict with federal
law or policy. DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151,171-72
(1983). In rare circumstances the court will determine that Congress intended
that no limitations period apply. See Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S.
355 (1977)(Title VII enforcement actions brought by the EEOC); County of
Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 240-44 (1985)(federal common law
actions by Indians to enforce property rights).
24. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982).
25. FLFMNG JAMES, JR. Er AL., CIvIL PROCEDURE 201 (4th ed. 1992).
26. Id.
27. Id See Kalmich v. Bruno, 553 F.2d 549 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 940 (1977).
1993]
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den of proving that the claim arose within the limitations period.28
Federal law treats statutes of limitations as affirmative defenses. 29
The burden of proof is on the party asserting the defense. Under Rule
12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant30 must plead a
limitations defense in the answer or raise it in a Rule 12(b) motion.3 1
Otherwise, the statute of limitations defense is waived.3 2 When a
waiver occurs, the court may, nevertheless, allow the defendant to
amend his or her answer to add a limitations defense if the interests of
justice would be served.33 Usually, the court decides whether a claim
is time-barred on a summary judgment motion. However, the defend-
ant may bring a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted or a Rule 12(c) motion for
judgment on the pleadings if the complaint states an accrual date
which is outside the limitations period.34
Certain equitable factors may affect statutes of limitations. Tolling
provisions suspend the running of the limitations period.35 For exam-
ple, statutes of limitations are commonly suspended during the plain-
tiff's incapacity3 6 or the defendant's fraudulent concealment of the
plaintiff's injury or right of action. 37 Under these circumstances, pol-
icy dictates that the plaintiff's and society's interests in having the
28. FLEMING JAMEs, JR. sT Ai-, CIWL PROcEDURE 201 (4th ed. 1992).
29. FED. R CirV. P. 8(c) provides in part, "In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party
shall set forth affirmatively... statute of limitations .... " See 5A CHARLES A.
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE AND PROCEDURE § 1394
(1990)[hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER].
30. The term "defendant" is used here for convenience and clarity. Other parties to a
lawsuit may also assert a statute of limitations defense. For example, a plaintiff
may assert a limitations defense to a counterclaim or crossclaim. See FED. R CIV.
P. 12(b).
31. FED. R. CIv. P. 12()(6). See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 29, § 1394.
32. WRIGHT & MiE, supra note 29, § 1394.
33. FED. R. Civ. 15. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 29, § 1394.
34. JAmis WM. MOORE, 2A MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 12.10 (2d ed. 1992). If the
court cannot determine whether the statute of limitations has run from the face
of the pleadings, it may convert a Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c) motion to a summary
judgment motion. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b),(c).
35. They may also enlarge the limitations period, provide alternate limitations peri-
ods, or restart the limitations period. Siegel, Practice Commentary, supra note 1,
at 100. For a discussion of the policies underlying tolling and common circum-
stances which lead to tolling, see Special Project, supra note 1, at 1084-90;
CORMAN, supra note 14, §§ 8.1-10.7.
36. Incapacity occurs when the plaintiff is not capable of asserting his or her claim.
For example, the plaintiff's insanity, incarceration, or absence from the state may
suspend the statute of limitations.
37. Fraudulent concealment occurs when the defendant prevents the plaintiff from
discovering the plaintiff's injury or right of action. For a discussion of fraudulent
concealment, see Richard L. Marcus, Fraudulent Concealment in Federal Court-
Toward a More Disparate Standard?, 71 GEO. L. J. 829, 845-55 (1983); Special Pro-
ject, supra note 1, at 1019-20.
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claim heard outweigh the defendant's interest in repose and the dan-
ger of litigating a stale claim.38 For federal causes of action, the
Supreme Court has recognized that tolling may be appropriate where:
a claimant has received inadequate notice ... where a motion for appointment
of counsel is pending and equity would justify tolling the statutory period un-
til the motion is acted upon,... where the court has led the plaintiff to believe
that she had done everything required of her,... [or] where affirmative mis-
conduct on the part of a defendant lulled the plaintiff into inaction .... 39
Tolling may also be appropriate to effectuate federal policy.40As a gen-
eral rule, however, the courts apply statutes of limitations strictly be-
cause of the important policies they serve.41
B. The Policies Underlying Limitations Periods42
Statutes of limitations "intimately affect" the plaintiff's right to
recover.4 3 Once the limitations period has run, the plaintiff loses his
or her right to assert an action. Therefore, they are an integral part of
the underlying claim.44
38. Special Project, supra note 1, at 1085. Under the Erie doctrine federal courts
apply state tolling provisions in diversity cases. See Ragan v. Merchants Transfer
& Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 532-34 (1949)(reaffirmed by Walker v. Armco
Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980)). If the federal court borrows a state statute of
limitations for a federal claim, it will also apply the state's tolling provisions un-
less they would be inconsistent with federal law or policy. Board of Regents v.
Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 487 (1980).
39. Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151 (1984)(citations
omitted).
40. See Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S.
311 (1965)(tolling the statute of limitations under the Clayton Act during Federal
Trade Commission proceedings).
41. See Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478,487 (1980)("Statutes of limitations
are not simply technicalities. On the contrary, they have long been respected as
fundamental to a well-ordered judicial system .. ").
42. For a discussion of the policies underlying statutes of limitations, see generally
Boswell, supra note 14, at 1463-64; Developments in the Law-Statutes of
Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1185-86 (1950)[hereinafter Developments];
Fischer, supra note 11, at 1-2; Special Project, supra note 1, at 1014-18; CoRmAN,
supra note 14, § 1.1 at 11-17.
43. Referring to statutes of limitations in diversity cases, the Supreme Court has
stated:
Plainly enough, a statute that would completely bar recovery in a suit if
brought in a State court bears on a State-created right vitally and not
merely formally or negligibly. As to consequences that so intimately af-
fect recovery or non-recovery a federal court in a diversity case should
follow State law.
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945); See also Walker v. Armco
Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 745 (1980). The statute of limitations applied to a fed-
eral claim also "vitally affects" the underlying right because it determines the
duration of that right. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc.,
483 U.S. 143, 147-48 (1987). See also Boswell, supra note 14, at 1461.
44. Statutes of limitations are considered "substantive law" for the purposes of Erie
analysis. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). In Erie R.R. v.
19931
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:454
Statutes of limitations reflect a delicate balance among the plain-
tiff's, defendant's, and society's interests.45 They are designed to cre-
ate predictability, uniformity, and fairness by preventing litigation of
stale claims.46 Limitations periods must be long enough to protect the
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the Supreme Court held that a federal court sitting
in diversity must apply the same substantive law that the forum state court would
apply. Accordingly, federal courts apply state statutes of limitations to diversity
claims. Guaranty Trust Co., 326 U.S. 99. Because federal substantive law applies
in federal question claims, courts also apply federal statutes of limitations to fed-
eral question claims. See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 394-95 (1946).
Even when the court borrows a state limitations period for a federal question
claim, the borrowed period becomes federal law. See DelCostello v. International
Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 159 n.13 (1983); West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35, 39
(1987). See also infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
The courts, however, have characterized statutes of limitations differently in
some other contexts. For example, the states treat their statutes of limitations as
"procedural law" for choice-of-law decisions. See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486
U.S. 717 (1988). Butsee Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 305 A.2d 412,415-18 (N.J. 1973).
See also Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964)(holding that when a federal
court transfers venue, the transferee court must apply the same law that the
transferring court would apply.); Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516
(1990)(applying Van Dusen choice-of-law rules to plaintiff-initiated transfers as
well as defendant-initiated transfers). Justice Brennan has described statutes of
limitations as having both substantive and procedural aspects. Sun Oil Co., 486
U.S. at 736 (Brennan, J. concurring in judgment).
Because this article focuses on borrowing limitations periods for federal law
claims, the problem of how statutes of limitations should be treated in conflict-of-
law and venue transfer cases is beyond the scope of this article. For a discussion
of this complex area, see generally Bruce Posnak, The Court Doesn't Know Its
Asahi from Its Wortman: A Critical View of the Constitutional Constraints on
Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 41 SYRAcusE L. REv. 875 (1990); David E. Seidel-
son, 1 (Wortman) + 1 (Ferens) = 6 (Years): That Can't Be Right-Can It? Stat-
utes of Limitations and Supreme Court Inconsistency, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 787
(1991); David H. Vernon, Statutes of Limitation in the Conflict of Laws: Borrow-
ing Statutes, 32 ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 287 (1960); Sam Walker, Forum Shopping
for Stale Claims: Statutes of Limitations and Conflict of Laws, 23 AKRON L. REV.
19 (1989); Ibrahim J. Wani, Borrowing Statutes, Statutes of Limitations and Mod-
ern Choice of Law, 57 UMKC L. REv. 681 (1989); Louise Weinberg, Choosing Law:
The Limitations Debates, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 683.
Regardless of how the courts designate statutes of limitations in a given con-
text, as a practical matter, once the limitations period has run, the plaintiff loses
his or her right to assert a claim. Therefore, the statute of limitations is impor-
tant to the underlying legal right. See DAVID D. SIEGEL, NEW YoRK PRACTICE 37
(2d ed. 1991)("[T]here is little else in law that can destroy a case so quickly and
from the defendant's point of view so conveniently.")
45. See Ellen E. Kaulbach, A Functional Approach to Borrowing Limitations Periods
for Federal Statutes, 77 CAL. L. REv. 133, 135 (1989).
46. See Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 240 (1989)("Predictability, a primary goal of
statutes of limitations, was frustrated" by "seeking state-law analogies for partic-
ular § 1983 claims."); Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 751-52 n.12
(1980)(holding that the requirement of actual service "does nothing to promote
the general policy behind all statutes of limitations of keeping stale claims out of
court.").
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plaintiff's and society's interests in having the claim prosecuted. On
the other hand, they must be short enough to protect the defendant,
the court, and society from wasting time and resources litigating old
claims.47
Time-bars also reflect the legislature's evaluation of the underlying
cause of action and the policies implicated. A short period may reflect
disapproval of the underlying right, a desire to protect the defendant,
or the need for prompt dispute resolution.48 For example, actions
against public officials frequently have a short statute of limitations to
discourage such claims.49 Intentional tort actions may have a short
time-bar because the victim usually knows immediately what the ef-
fects of an intentional tort will be and should not "sit on" his or her
claim.50 Labor actions also tend to have a short limitations period to
promote rapid resolution of labor disputes.5 1
To choose an appropriate limitations period, the legislature must
evaluate the nature of the underlying cause of action, its policies, and
society's interests in having the right asserted.52 Then the legislature
47. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454,463-64 (1975)("[IThe length
of the period allowed for instituting suit inevitably reflects a value judgment con-
cerning the point at which the interests in favor of protecting valid claims are
outweighed by the interests in prohibiting the prosecution of stale ones.").
48. Developments, supra note 42, at 1180.
49. See ag., Pauk v. Board of Trustees, 654 F.2d 856, 862 (2d Cir. 1981)(stating that
N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAw § 50-i, which provides a one-year statute of limitations for
tort claims against municipalities, is designed "to provide more restrictive reme-
dies against municipal employees for their torts than are available against private
citizens, for whom the limitations period... is three years"), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
1000 (1982), overruled on other grounds by Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985));
N.Y. Cirv. PRAc. L. & P 215(1)(McKinney 1990)(providing a one-year limitation
on actions "against a sheriff, coroner or constable, upon a liability incurred by
him by doing an act in his official capacity or by omission of an official duty,
except the non-payment of money collected upon an execution").
50. See, e.g., Okure v. Owens, 816 F.2d 45, 49-50 (2d Cir. 1987)(Van Graafeiland, J.,
dissenting)(discussing New York's one-year statute of limitations for certain enu-
merated intentional torts), aff'd, 488 U.S. 235 (1989).
51. See, ag., National Labor Relations Act § 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b)(1988)(providing
a six-month limitations period for filing unfair labor practice charges before the
NLRB); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(e)(1988)(requiring that an employment discrimination charge be filed with the
EEOC within 180 days, or 300 days in a deferral state, of the discriminatory act).
See also DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 168 (1983).
52. See Okure v. Owens, 816 F.2d 45,48 (2d Cir. 1987)(reasoning that limitations must
be long enough to effectuate the policy of the claim.), ffl'd, 488 U.S. 235 (1989);
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985)(characterizing § 1983 claims, for limita-
tions purposes, as tort actions for recovery of damages "is supported by the nature
of the § 1983 remedy, and by the federal interest in ensuring that the borrowed
period of limitations not discriminate against the federal civil rights remedy").
Society's interest in most causes of action is to protect citizens' rights and de-
ter harmful or other undesirable conduct. Depending on the particular type of
action, society will have other specific interests. For example, the legislature may
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must select a reasonable time in which the plaintiff can discover, in-
vestigate, and assert his or her claim.5S The legislature must also esti-
mate how long the evidence and witnesses will be available and
reliable. The time period chosen is the period after which the need for
repose and avoiding stale claims outweighs the interests in enforcing
the claim.54
Statutes of limitations are designed to protect defendants by giving
them repose.55 Defendants do not have to live their entire lives fear-
want to compensate victims for their injuries and punish wrongdoers by allowing
claims for compensatory and punitive damages. Some statutes give private citi-
zens the right to sue so that they will act as "private attorneys general." Environ-
mental protection and anti-discrimination laws often fall into this category. See
generally Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,415 (195)(Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964); Newman v. Piggy Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400,
402 (1968) (Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Stoddard v. Western Carolina
Regional Sewer Auth., 784 F.2d 1200,1209 (1986)(Clean Water Act); Metropolitan
Washington Coalition for Clean Air v. District of Columbia, 639 F.2d 802, 804
(1981)(Clean Air Act). As "private attorneys general," plaintiffs help enforce im-
portant societal interests where government lacks either the resources or polit-
ical will for comprehensive enforcement. Society has a particularly strong
interest in having these claims asserted.
53. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that litigants make a
reasonable inquiry into the law and facts of their claims before asserting them.
The attorney of record or pro se litigant must sign all court papers. The signature
on the pleading certifies that the claim asserted is "well grounded in fact and is
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modifica-
tion, or reversal of existing law," and not interposed for an improper reason.
FED. R. CIv. P. 11. Litigants and their attorneys who violate Rule 11 are subject
to sanctions. Id Many states have rules similar to Rule 11 although the majority
are weaker versions. See, eg., CAL. CODE CIV. P. § 128.5; TEx. R. CIV. P. 13.
Courts also have the inherent power to sanction litigants for asserting frivolous
claims. See Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123 (1991). Therefore, the statute
of limitations must afford litigants sufficient time to make a reasonable inquiry
into both the law and the facts before commencing an action. Moreover, the
Supreme Court's decision in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)(discuss-
ing the plaintiff's burden on summary judgment), may increase the need for pre-
litigation investigation even though non-movants are entitled to reasonable
discovery before the court can grant summary judgment against them.
54. In Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 736 (1988)(Brennan, J., concurring in
judgment), Justice Brennan described statutes of limitations as a "complicated
temporal balance." Stating that they could not be characterized as "purely proce-
dural or purely substantive," he explained the balancing of interests as follows:
The statute of limitations a State enacts represents a balance be-
tween, on one hand, its substantive interest in vindicating substantive
claims and, on the other hand, a combination of its procedural interest in
freeing its courts from adjudicating stale claims and its substantive inter-
est in giving individuals repose from ancient breaches of law. A State
that has enacted a particular limitations period has simply determined
that after that period the interest in vindicating claims becomes out-
weighed by the combination of the interests in repose and avoiding stale
claims.
Id. See also Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 463-64 (1975).
55. See Agency Holding Co. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 156
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ing that they will be sued for past deeds. As a result, time-bars help
stabilize commercial and property transactions.56 With a known pe-
riod of liability, defendants can arrange their personal and commercial
lives accordingly. They can also collect and preserve evidence against
the possibility of suit while the evidence is fresh. Moreover, time-bars
protect defendants from unfair surprise and the prejudice of having to
defend themselves years after the claim arose when the evidence and
witnesses may be scarce or lost.57 Statutes of limitations thus force
plaintiffs to assert their claims in a timely fashion when the evidence
and witnesses' memories are fresh5s
Periods of limitations also assist the courts, and thus society, by
preserving resources and promoting the legitimacy of the judicial pro-
cess.5 9 They play a major role in reducing the courts' crowded dockets
by deterring litigants from filing most time-barred claims. Untimely
claims that are filed can usually be dismissed in a pretrial motion. As
a result, the courts do not have to waste valuable time and resources
litigating stale claims.
More importantly, statutes of limitations promote accuracy and
fairness.6 0 Through time-bars the courts avoid dealing with unreliable
witnesses and stale, or even false, evidence. Discussing the policies
underlying statutes of limitations, the Supreme Court has said:
A federal cause of action "brought at any distance of time" would be "utterly
repugnant to the genius of our laws." Just determinations of fact cannot be
made when, because of the passage of time, the memories of witnesses have
faded or evidence is lost. In compelling circumstances, even wrongdoers are
entitled to assume that their sins may be forgotten.6
1
(1987)(quoting Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271 (1985))(" '[E]ven wrongdoers
are entitled to assume that their sins may be forgotten.' "); Wilson v. Garcia, 471
U.S. 261, 275 n.34 (1985) ("Defendants cannot calculate their contingent liabilities,
not knowing with confidence when their delicts lie in repose."); id- at 282
(O'Connor, J., dissenting)("[A] legislature's selection of differing limitations peri-
ods for a claim sounding in defamation and one based on a written contract is
grounded in its evaluation of the characteristics of those claims relevant to the
realistic life expectancy of the evidence and the adversary's reasonable expecta-
tions of repose."). See also Special Project, supra note 1, at 1017-18.
56. Developments, supra note 42, at 1185-86; Special Project, supra note 1, at 1016.
57. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271 (1985).
58. See Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478,487 (1980)("The process of discov-
ery and trial which results in the finding of ultimate facts for or against the plain-
tiff by the judge or jury is obviously more reliable if the witness or testimony in
question is relatively fresh.").
59. Special Project, supra note 1, at 1016-17.
60. See i-i
61. Agency Holding Co. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 156 (1987)(cita-
tion omitted) (quoting Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271 (1985)). See also Board
of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478,487 (1980)("[I]n the judgment of most legisla-
tures and courts, there comes a point at which the delay of a plaintiff in asserting
a claim is sufficiently likely either to impair the accuracy of the fact-finding pro-
cess or to upset settled expectations that a substantive claim will be barred with-
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Finally, to the extent that the public perceives that time-bars prevent
frivolous claims and promote accuracy, they also help preserve the
public's perception of the courts' legitimacy.
To effectuate these policies, statutes of limitations must be easy to
identify and apply.62 They should also be applied fairly to protect liti-
gants' rights. Unfortunately, the practice of borrowing periods of limi-
tations for federal causes of action is complex, confusing, and often
inequitable. Moreover, the period borrowed is seldom well-tailored to
the underlying claim because Congress has not engaged in the neces-
sary balancing of interests.
III. PROBLEMS WITH BORROWING ANALOGOUS STATUTES
OF LIMITATIONS
If the state or federal statute contains an express statute of limita-
tions for the cause of action it creates, determining what limitations
period to apply is not a problem. The time period specified in the stat-
ute applies.6 3 When a state statute does not contain a limitations pe-
riod, the state's generalized statutes of limitations will usually supply
one.64 Unlike the states, however, Congress has not enacted limita-
tions periods for general categories of federal claims,6 5 and until re-
cently, no general "fallback" statute of limitations existed. Instead,
Congress has relied on the courts to supply time-bars where it has
failed to do so.
Determining appropriate limitations periods for federal claims has
become a significant problem. Over the years Congress has created
numerous causes of action without statutes of limitations.66 More-
over, the courts have recognized implied rights of action arising under
out respect to whether it is meritorious."); Bell v. Morrison, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 351,
360 (1828)(Story, J.)("It is a wise and beneficial law.., to afford security against
stale demands, after the true state of the transaction may have been forgotten, or
be incapable of explanation, by reason of the death or removal of witnesses.").
62. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266 (1985)(quoting Chardon v. Fumero Soto,
462 U.S. 650, 667 (1983)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting)) ("'Few areas of the law stand
in greater need of firmly defined, easily applied rules than does the subject of
periods of limitations.' ").
63. See generally Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946)("If Congress ex-
plicitly puts a limit upon the time for enforcing a right which it created, there is
an end of the matter.").
64. See supra text accompanying notes 13-18.
65. But see supra note 20.
66. See Reed v. United Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319, 323 (1989)("Congress not infre-
quently fails to supply an express statute of limitations when it creates a federal
cause of action."); Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483 (1980)(noting
that Congress' failure to enact a specific statute of limitations is "a void which is
commonplace in federal statutory law"). For some examples of federal statutory
causes of action without express limitations periods, see supra note 22.
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federal legislation 67 and even a few federal common law actions.68 No
explicit limitations provisions exist for these causes of action.
A. Borrowing State Law
When a federal claim has no express limitations period, the courts
do not assume that the claim lasts indefinitely.69 Rather, they "fill in
the gap" by supplying a time-bar.7O However, the Supreme Court has
recognized that the judiciary is not the appropriate body to create peri-
ods of limitations.7 1 As discussed in Part II above, statutes of limita-
tions require a delicate balancing of interests.72 They are also
arbitrary by nature, at least to some extent.73 As political branches of
government accountable to the public, legislatures are better equipped
than the federal judiciary to do the appropriate balancing and to select
a time limit.74 Accordingly, judges have refused to fashion periods of
67. See eg., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983)(finding an im-
plied right of action for securities fraud under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353
(1982)(finding an implied right of action for damages under the Commodities Fu-
tures Trading Commission Act); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677
(1979)(finding an implied right of action for sex discrimination under Title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v.
Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979)(finding an implied private right of action for recision
under § 215 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940); Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)(finding an
implied right of action for Constitutional violations by federal officials); Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171,(1967)(finding an implied right of action for breach of the
union's duty of fair representation under § 301 of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964)(finding an implied right of
action by shareholders for damages for violation of § 14(a) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934).
68. See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985)(recognizing a
federal common law right of ejectment to enforce Indian property rights).
This article treats causes of action which arise under federal common law as
distinct from actions implied under federal legislation or the Constitution.
Although both are considered "federal common law," the former derives from
non-statutory sources. See id.; Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 805, 832-33 (1989). Implied actions involve filling in statutory "gaps"
and derive from the court's role in interpreting statutes. See generally Boswell,
-upra note 14, at 1452-53.
69. DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158 (1983).
70. See id. at 158-59. The federal courts' power to "fill in the gaps" necessary in inter-
preting federal legislation derives from the courts' power to decide cases and con-
troversies under Article III of the Constitution. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137 (1803); Boswell, supra note 14, at 1449 & n.12.
71. See UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 698 (1966).
72. See supra text accompanying notes 45-62.
73. Weinberg, supra note 44, at 686.
74. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 169
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)(asserting that examining the underly-
ing policies of a federal cause of action to determine whether those policies are
better served by borrowing a federal or state statute of limitations is "quintessen-
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limitations without legislative guidance. To do otherwise would con-
stitute a "drastic sort of judicial legislation."75 Instead, they borrow
the forum state's most analogous statute of limitations unless it con-
flicts with federal law or policy.76 When a conflict occurs, the courts
usually select the most analogous federal statute of limitations.77
In the absence of Congressional legislation, borrowing a limitations
period makes sense. It avoids judicial legislating and helps to effectu-
ate the policies that time-bars serve. Although the state legislature
may not have considered the federal right at issue,78 it will have done
at least some interest balancing. The closer the analogy between the
federal right of action and the state right underlying the borrowed
limitations period, the more appropriate the balancing.79
Borrowing state time-bars for federal claims also creates greater
intrastate predictability and uniformity than if the federal courts were
free to fashion their own limitations periods. Theoretically at least, all
of the courts within the same state, including a multi-district state,
will choose the same limitations period for a given federal action. Liti-
gants and judges need only look to the state's law to determine the
correct time-period. Litigants can also expect that the same state limi-
tations period will govern similar federal and state claims arising out
of the same transaction or occurrence.80 Unfortunately, borrowing
seldom works as well in practice as it does in theory.81 In addition,
tially the kind of judgment to be made by a legislature"); NYSBA REPORT, supr
note 1, at 1 ("essentially legislative task"); Special Project, supra note 1, at 1044
("[T]he very arbitrariness of statutes of limitations argues against judicial
rulemaking. It is better left to the legislatures; whenever judges engage in this
type of line-drawing, a chorus of criticism generally follows.").
75. UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 703 (1966).
76. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985).
77. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 147-48 (1987).
But see County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985); Occidental
Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 (1977).
78. See Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977).
79. The Supreme Court has explained:
By adopting the statute governing an analogous cause of action under
state law, federal law incorporates the State's judgment on the proper
balance between the policies of repose and the substantive policies of
enforcement embodied in the state cause of action. However, when the
federal claim differs from the state cause of action in fundamental re-
spects, the State's choice of a specific period of limitation is, at best, only
a rough approximation of "the point at which the interests in favor of
protecting valid claims are outweighed by the interests in prohibiting the
prosecution of stale ones."
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271 (1985)(citation omitted).
80. See Marcus, Memorandum, supra note 1, at 12-13. For example, an employee who
has been fired because of race discrimination might assert a claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 and a supplemental tort claim for wrongful discharge in the same suit.
Applying the state's personal injury statute of limitations to both the § 1983 and
tort claims simplifies the litigation and avoids potential surprise to the parties.
81. See Marcus, Memorandum, supra note 1, at 13; infra text accompanying notes
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borrowing fails to promote interstate predictability and uniformity be-
cause each state has its own statutes of limitations.8 2
When the federal courts borrow a state time-bar for a federal
claim, they convert the time period to federal law. In doing so, they
fashion federal common law.83 Under the Supremacy Clause8 4 that
period then becomes applicable to the state courts when adjudicating
the same federal claim.
The courts are neither legislatively nor constitutionally required to
borrow state law when a federal claim has no explicit statute of limita-
tions.8 5 Early cases interpreted the Rules of Decision Act8 6 as requir-
ing the federal courts to apply the states' limitations periods to federal
claims when Congress was silent.8 7 However, the Supreme Court sub-
sequently rejected that interpretation.8 8 Today, the courts borrow
104-40. For example, the federal court would apply two different limitations peri-
ods if the employee in the preceding footnote asserted a supplemental claim for
breach of contract with her § 1981 claim. The state's general personal injury stat-
ute of limitations would still govern her § 1981 claim even though the state's limi-
tations period for breach of contract would govern her supplemental claim. See
Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 107 U.S. 2617 (1987).
82. See infra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
83. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 269 (1985)(quoting Sullivan v. Little Hunting
Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 240 (1969))('Even when principles of state law are bor-
rowed to assist in the enforcement of this federal remedy, the state rule is
adopted as 'a federal rule responsive to the need whenever a federal right is im-
paired.' "); Board of County Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 351-52
(1939)("[S]tate law has been absorbed... as the governing federal rule not be-
cause state law was the source of the right but because recognition of state inter-
ests was not deemed inconsistent with federal policy."); Boswell, -upra note 14, at
1451-56; Special Project, supra note 1, at 1029. But see Agency Holding Co. v.
Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 158-64 (1987)(Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment)(arguing that state law applies of its own force unless pre-empted by
federal law).
84. U.S. CONST. art VI.
85. But see Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 239 (1989)(interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to
require the courts to borrow state statutes of limitations for civil rights claims
with no express limitations periods).
For a history of borrowing state statutes of limitations for federal legislation
without explicit time bars, see Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs.,
Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 158-61 (1987)(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); Special pro-
ject, supm note 1, at 1024-42; Kaulbach, supra note 45, at 136-38.
86. The Rules of Decision Act currently provides: The laws of the several states,
except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Con-
gress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil
actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1652 (1988).
87. See Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 614-16 (1895); McClaine v. Rankin, 197
U.S. 154, 158 (1905).
88. In DelCostello the Supreme Court stated-
Since Erie, no decision of this Court has held or suggested that the
(Rules of Decision) Act requires borrowing state law to fill gaps in fed-
eral substantive statutes. Of course, we have continued since Erie to ap-
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state statutes of limitations for federal claims based on Congress' ac-
quiescence in the courts' prior practice of borrowing state time-bars.
The courts assume, absent contrary indication, that Congress intends
for them to borrow state law when an explicit time-bar is not
provided.89
1. Choosing the Most Analogous State Statute of Limitations
In order to determine which state statute of limitations to borrow,
the court must analyze both the federal right and the state's various
causes of action.90 From this analysis, the court must decide which
state right is most analogous to the federal right and then determine
which state statute of limitations applies to that state right. Federal
law governs how the federal claim is characterized.91 The court may
consider how the state would characterize the federal right provided
the state's characterization does not conflict with federal policy.92
ply state limitations periods to many federal causes of action; but we
made clear in Holmberg v. Arrnbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 394-395 (1946), that
we do so as a matter of interstitial fashioning of remedial details under
the respective substantive federal statutes, and not because the Rules of
Decision Act or the Erie doctrine requires it.
DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 159 n.13 (1983). But
see ic. at 172-74 (Stevens, J., dissenting)(arguing that the Rules of Decision Act
requires the courts to borrow state limitations periods); Martin H. Redish, Fed-
eral Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretive Process: An "Insti-
tutionalist" Perspective, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 761 (1989)(arguing that the Rules of
Decision Act should be construed to preclude all substantive federal common
law).
89. The Supreme Court explained:
In some instances, of course, there may be some direct indication in
the legislative history suggesting that Congress did in fact intend that
state statutes should apply. More often, however, Congress has not
given any express consideration to the problem. In such cases, the gen-
eral preference for borrowing state limitations periods could more aptly
be called a sort of fallback rule of thumb than a matter of ascertaining
legislative intent; it rests on the assumption that, absent some sound rea-
son to do otherwise, Congress would likely intend that the courts follow
their previous practice of borrowing state provisions.
DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158 n.12 (1983). See
also Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 147
(1987)("Given our longstanding practice of borrowing state law, and the congres-
sional awareness of this practice, we can generally assume that Congress intends
by its silence that we borrow state law.").
90. Kaulbach, supra note 45, at 138-39. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-79
(1985)(comparing § 1983 claims with various state causes of action).
91. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 147 (1987)(cit-
ing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 269-70 (1985))('The characterization of a fed-
eral claim for purposes of selecting the appropriate statute of limitations is
generally a question of federal law ...."). However, Congress can dictate that the
state's characterization be used. See Federal Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674
(1988).
92. See UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 706 (1966).
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
However, the state's characterization is not binding.93
There are a number of ways in which a court may characterize a
federal claim and analogize it to a state right. The court may compare
the legal theories involved, the elements of the causes of action, the
remedies sought, the type of injuries, and the particular facts of the
pending case.94 The court may also examine the policies underlying
the federal right and choose the state law which best reflects those
policies.95 Depending on the court's approach, a federal cause of ac-
tion may be characterized on a case-by-case basis or all federal claims
arising under a particular statutory provision may be given one gen-
eral characterization. 96
The Supreme Court has provided little practical guidance as to how
the analysis should be done. However, the cases suggest a three-part
inquiry.97 The first step is to decide whether the federal right of ac-
tion requires a uniform characterization. The Supreme Court has
stated that "[t]he initial inquiry is whether all claims arising out of the
federal statute 'should be characterized in the same way, or whether
they should be evaluated differently depending upon the varying fac-
tual circumstances and legal theories presented in each individual
case."' 98 The court is more likely to adopt a uniform characterization
when different types of claims can be asserted under the same statu-
tory provision and there is a strong public interest in having the claim
asserted.99 Case-by-case analogy of such claims would thwart public
policy by generating "uncertainty and time-consuming litigation."100
93. 1&
94. Kaulbach, supra note 45, at 138-39; Special Project, supra note 1, at 1066.
95. See Special Project, supra note 1, at 1066-67.
96. See, eg., Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985)(characterizing all claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 as personal injury claims for statute of limitations purposes).
97. See id. at 268; Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc, 483 U.S. 143,
147 (1987); Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct.
2773,2779 (1991)(plurality opinion). See generlly Reed v. United Transp. Union,
488 U.S. 319, 325-35 (1989).
98. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 147
(1987)(quoting Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268 (1985)).
99. See, ag., Reed v. United Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)(claims against
unions for violations of their members' rights of free speech and assembly under
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S.
261, 275 (1985)(§ 1983 claims); Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gil-
bertson, Il S. Ct. 2773, 2778 (1991)(implied claims under § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5); Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & As-
socs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 149-50 (1987)(private enforcement claims under RICO).
100. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 272 (1985). The plurality in Gilbertson explained:
Where a federal cause of action tends in practice to "encompass numer-
ous and diverse topics and subtopics," ... such that a single state limita-
tions period may not be consistently applied within a jurisdiction, we
have concluded that the federal interests in predictability and judicial
economy counsel the adoption of one source, or class of sources, for bor-
rowing purposes.
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The second step is to decide whether state or federal law should sup-
ply the limitations period.101 In most cases state law will apply.102
The final step is to "characterize the essence of the claim in the pend-
ing case and decide which state statute provides the most appropriate
limiting principle."10 3
2. Problems with Borrowing State Statutes of Limitations
On its face, borrowing appears to be a relatively attractive solution.
Too often, however, no clear match exists. More than one state limita-
tions period may be applicable, or none may be particularly analo-
gous.' 0 4 Unless a higher, binding court has already decided the issue,
the litigants and judge must spend time and resources characterizing
the federal claim and then analogizing it to the forum state's various
causes of action and statutes of limitations.105 The search is often dif-
ficult. The most analogous statute of limitations may not be found in
the state's generalized limitations periods, but in a specific state stat-
ute. As one practice manual warns the practitioner, "No general list
can be relied upon and the only safe course is to carefully research
Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2779
(1991) (citation omitted).
For example, § 1983 civil rights claims may resemble a variety of state actions
including different common law and statutory tort actions, state actions against
public officials, and claims for rights created by statute. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S.
261, 272-73 (1985). Section 1983 embodies a strong public interest in vindicating
federal civil rights. The Supreme Court found that uncertainty and peripheral
litigation would undermine this policy if each § 1983 claim were characterized
separately for borrowing a limitations period. In Wilson, the Court concluded
that all § 1983 claims should be characterized as personal injury claims. Id at 276.
The Supreme Court subsequently narrowed its characterization. In Owens v.
Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989), the Court directed courts to borrow the states' general
personal injury or residual personal injury statutes of limitations for all § 1983
claims. For a discussion of the problems with borrowing state limitations periods
for § 1983 claims see infra text accompanying notes 141-99.
101. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143,147 (1987). For
a discussion on borrowing federal statutes of limitations, see infra notes 216-40
and accompanying text.
102. See Reed v. United Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)(warning that borrow-
ing a federal statute of limitations is a "closely circumscribed exception to the
general rule that statutes of limitation are to be borrowed from state law").
103. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268 (1985). See also Reed v. United Transp. Union,
488 U.S. 319, 325-27 (1989).
104. Siegel, Practice Commentary, supra note 1, at 98-99.
105. The question of which limitations period to borrow remains unsettled until the
Supreme Court ultimately decides the question. Even in circuits where the
courts have applied the same statute of limitations for years, a Supreme Court
ruling can upset settled expectations. See Lampf, Pleva, IApkin, Prupis & Pe-
tigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773, (1991)(upsetting over 30 years' precedents in
the Ninth Circuit); Siegel, Practice Commentary, supra note 1, at 98 ("ITihe
guessing isn't over until the highest court that the case can be (and is) taken to
decides the point.").
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each potential claim before concluding that no 'special' limitations pe-
riod protects the likely defendant."06
The limitations period applied to a federal right usually varies
from state to state because courts characterize claims differently.107
Moreover, each state has enacted its own limitations statutes. When a
state has more than one analogous statute of limitations, the limita-
tions period applied to a federal right may vary within the same state
or even from judge to judge within the same judicial district.108 As a
result, borrowing creates confusion, unpredictability, and a lack of
uniformity. 0 9
The uncertainty and confusion, in turn, generate wasteful litiga-
tion."0 Because the court will never hear the merits of a time-barred
claim, litigants try to characterize claims so that the court will borrow
the statute of limitations which is most advantageous for their side."'
As a result, trial courts are forced to spend time litigating limitations
disputes before they can reach the merits. Uncertainty also encour-
ages appeals because of the important consequences to the litigants." 2
The Supreme Court's discussion of the problems which borrowing
generated in civil rights cases before Wilson v. Garcia13 and Owens v.
Okuren 4 is equally applicable to other areas where borrowing has cre-
ated uncertainty:
[T]he legislative purpose to create an effective remedy for the enforcement of
federal civil rights is obstructed by uncertainty in the applicable statute of
limitations, for scarce resources must be dissipated by useless litigation on col-
lateral matter.
On a human level, uncertainty is costly to all parties. Plaintiffs may be
denied their just remedy if they delay in filing their claims, having wrongly
postulated that the courts would apply a longer statute. Defendants cannot
calculate their contingent liabilities, not knowing with confidence when their
delicts lie in repose.115
Borrowing state time-bars also encourages forum shopping.1l 6 If
the federal claim can be brought in more than one state, plaintiffs will
search for the state with the longest limitations period when timing is
a problem.i"7 Unless the forum state has a borrowing law, which can
106. OscAR G. CHASE ET Al, WEINSTEIN, KORN AND MILLER CPLR MANuAL § 2.03, at
2-5 (2d ed. 1980).
107. Marcus, Memorandum, supra note 1, at 1.
108. NYSBA REPORT, supra note 1, at 1-2.
109. Id at 1.
110. Marcus, Memorandum, supra note 1, at 5; Siegel, Practice Commentary, supra
note 1, at 99.
111. Special Project, supra note 1, at 1075.
112. Id
113. 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
114. 488 U.S. 235 (1989).
115. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275 & n.34 (1985).
116. Marcus, Memorandum, supra note 1, at 8-9; NYSBA REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.
117. Even if the case is transferredto a more appropriate venue, the limitations period
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create its own problems,"8 the statute of limitations applied may have
no connection with the events underlying the claim.
Borrowing state time-bars poses special problems in complex litiga-
tion. In a case with multiple claimants and related claims arising in
different states, more than one state's statute of limitations may apply.
Trying to determine what state time-bars apply further complicates an
already complex action and may impair settlement negotiations. 119
Multiple time-bars also discourage consolidating claims that could be
tried together as class actions. 20
Borrowing may also encourage judicial abuse.' 2 ' A judge may be
tempted to borrow a short limitations period to avoid reaching the
merits of a claim he or she does not want to consider.22 Real or not,
the perception of arbitrary borrowing, together with the time spent
litigating limitations issues and reversals on appeal, impairs the
courts' credibility.S23
In addition to these practical problems, borrowing state time-bars
for federal claims raises serious equitable concerns. The state legisla-
tures do not consider the federal interests at issue when they adopt a
statute of limitations for a particular state right or category of state
rights.24 Accordingly, the litigants' interests in the federal right, as
well as society's interest in having that right asserted, are not part of
the state's balancing process. They are considered indirectly, if at all,
in the federal court's process of selecting the most analogous state
statute of limitations.' 5
More importantly, borrowing state time-bars leads to the inequita-
ble administration of federal rights. One of the main reasons for en-
acting a federal law, rather than leaving the problem to the states, is
the need for uniformity.26 When the courts borrow state limitations
of the state in which the suit was originally filed will apply. See Ferens v. John
Deere Co. 494 U.S. 516 (1990).
118. See Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334 (Wyo.), cer denied, 444 U.S. 863 (1979).
119. Marcus, Memorandum, supra note 1, at 10.
120. Id.
121. Special Project, supra note 1, at 1076-77.
122. Id. at 1077.
123. See generally Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 272 n.24 (1985)("[T]he adoption of
one analogy rather than another will often be somewhat arbitrary; in such a case,
the losing party may 'infer that the choice of a limitations period in his case was
result oriented, thereby undermining his belief that he has been dealt with
fairly.' ").
124. See Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977); NYSBA REPORT,
supra note 1, at 2.
125. See Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1393-94 (7th Cir. 1990)(Pos-
ner, J., concurring), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 2887 (1991). For an example of the
type of legislative policy analysis which borrowing forces judges to undertake, see
infra text accompanying notes 163-70.
126. See Erwin Chemerinsky & Larry Kramer, Defining the Role of the Federal
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periods for federal claims, federal rights vary from state to state be-
cause each state has its own statutes of limitations. For example, in a
judicial district where the court has borrowed a one-year statute of
limitations, a potential plaintiff will lose his or her right of recovery if
he or she does not commence the action within one year. However, in
a district where the court has borrowed a three-year statute of limita-
tions for the same federal right, a person retains his or her right to
bring suit for two additional years. Defendants' interests are similarly
affected. In the former district a potential defendant escapes liability
after only one year, but in the latter he or she is liable for three years.
The differences in time periods are often quite significant.=
Discussing the application of state limitations in diversity claims,
the Supreme Court has said, "We cannot give [the action] longer life in
the federal court than it would have had in the state court without
adding something to the cause of action."1 28 The same is true when
the courts apply different limitations periods to similar federal claims
in different states. Even if the courts characterize the federal claim in
the same way, the court that borrows a longer limitations period "adds
something" to the federal claim; the court that borrows a shorter limi-
tations period "takes something away."'129 Plaintiffs are thereby de-
nied equal opportunity to remedy violations of their federal rights.
The borrowing process thus constitutes judicial legislation which
raises both separation of powers and due process concerns.
Moreover, judicial decisions establishing new periods of limitations
Courts, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REv. 67, 83-84. Discussing federal question jurisdiction, the
authors state:
The primary reason for adding this [federal question] jurisdiction in 1875
is said to have been the desire for uniformity in the interpretation and
application of federal law. The underlying premise is that because the
Constitution, treaties, and statutes of the United States apply to the en-
tire country, they should have essentially the same meaning in all parts
of the country.
1d.
127. The limitation period for federal claims which borrow a state's general personal
injury statute of limitations varies from one to six years. Compare LA. CIrv. CODE
ANN. art. 3492 (West 1992 Supp.)(one year) with N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-
16(5)(1991)(six years). These include civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,
1983, and 1985; Bivens constitutional claims; and claims under the Labor-Manage-
ment Reporting and Disclosure Act for violations of union members' rights of
free speech and assembly. See also Drew G. Peel, Time to Learn" Borrowing a
Limitations Period forActions Arising under Section 1415(e)(2) of the Education
for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 1991 U. CaH. L. REv. 315, 324 & n.61
(stating that the limitations period applied to court actions challenging adminis-
trative rulings on "individualized education programs" under EAHCA has varied
from 30 days to six years).
128. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 746 (1980)(quoting Ragan v.
Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 533-34 (1949)).
129. See Siegel, Practice Commentary, supra note 1, at 99 ('"he time one has to sue on
a claim is wedded substantively to the claim itself .... )
19931
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are applied retroactively.13 0 Once the court announces a new limita-
tions period, that period applies to the litigants in the case announcing
the new rule and anyone else with a pending or potential claim. Un-
suspecting plaintiffs, relying on established precedents, may find their
claims time-barred while potential defendants may suddenly be sub-
ject to liability on claims they thought long since stale.
The problem of unfair surprise is dramatically demonstrated in
Lampf, Plevz Lipkind Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson.13 ' For more
than thirty years the Ninth Circuit applied the state's fraud statute of
limitations and tolling law to implied actions for securities fraud
under section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange ActL3 2 and SEC
Rule 10b-5.133 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court adopted the statute
of limitations in section 9(e) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. 3 4
The Court held that 10(b) actions must be commenced within one year
after discovering the facts constituting a violation and within three
years of the violation. 3 5 The Court also held that the three-year pe-
riod of repose was not subject to tolling. 3 8 Over the strong dissent of
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy,37 the Supreme Court applied the
one-and-three-year limitations period retroactively. 3 8 In spite of
what appeared to be settled law in the Ninth Circuit, the plaintiffs in
Gilbertson found themselves time-barred four and one-half years after
commencing their action.139 Justice O'Connor notes in her dissent
that the plaintiffs were barred from the courthouse simply because
"they were unable to predict the future."140
130. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773,2782
(1991); id at 2785-88 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); DelCostello v. International Bhd
of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 172 (1983)(applying a new statute of limitations retro-
actively to the parties without comment); Welch v. Cadre Capital, 946 F.2d 185 (2d
Cir. 1991), on remand from Northwest Sav. Bank v. Welch, 111 S. Ct. 2882 (1991);
Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 939 F.2d 1420 (10th Cir. 1991); Bank of Denver
v. Southeastern Capital Group, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 595 (D. Colo. 1991). See gener-
ally James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439 (1991).
131. 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991).
132. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)(1988).
133. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2785
(1991)(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
134. Id at 2782.
135. I&
136. Id.
137. Id. at 2785-88 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
138. Id at 2782.
139. Id. at 2786 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
140. Id. Congress has tried to legislatively overrule the retroactive effect of Gilbert-
son. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1 (Supp. 1992). At the time of this writing, the courts are
split over whether this provision is constitutional. See TGX Corp. v. Simmons,
786 F. Supp. 587 (E.D. La. 1992)(holding that section 27A violates the separation
of powers doctrine.); Bank of Denver v. Southeastern Capital Group, Inc., 789 F.
Supp. 1092 (D. Colo. 1992)(holding that section 27A violates the separation of
powers doctrine.); Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 971 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir.
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The current system of borrowing limitations periods for federal
claims thus creates both practical and equitable problems. Uncer-
tainty and the lack of uniformity force litigants and courts to expend
scarce resources searching for the most analogous statute of limita-
tions and litigating limitations issues. Borrowing also encourages fo-
rum shopping and may further complicate complex litigation. More
importantly, borrowing unfairly impairs litigants' federal rights and
undermines the courts' legitimacy.
3. 42 U.S.C §1983 CimsAs An Example
The history of civil rights litigation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in New
York State illustrates the problems that borrowing state time-bars can
create. Section 1983 provides a cause of action against persons acting
under color of state law for deprivation of federal rights.141 This stat-
ute is the primary means by which individuals can obtain relief against
local governments and state and local officials for violating their con-
stitutional and other federally protected rights.142
1992)(holding that section 27A does not violate the separation of powers doc-
trine); Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 977 F.2d 1533 (10th Cir. 1992)(holding
that section 27A does not violate the separation of powers doctrine); Axel John-
son, Inc. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 790 F. Supp. 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)(holding that
section 27A does not violate the separation of powers doctrine.); Brown v. Hutton
Group, 795 F. Supp. 1307 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)(holding that Section 27A does not vio-
late the separation of powers doctrine.).
141. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, sub-
jects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act
of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
142. Congress originally enacted what is now 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as part of the civil rights
legislation to control violence in the South after the Civil War. Wilson v. Garcia,
471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985). It was designed to "interpose the federal courts between
the States and the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights - to protect
the people from unconstitutional action under color of state law, 'whether that
action be executive, legislative or judicial."' Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225,242
(1972) (citation omitted).
Section 1983 allows suits against government employees and agents who vio-
late federal law while acting in their official capacity, whether or not they are
acting pursuant to official state custom or policy. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,
184 (1961). The Supreme Court has held that local governments and units, in-
cluding municipalities and local police departments, are "persons" within the
meaning of § 1983. Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658,
690 (1978). They may be held liable for injuries caused pursuant to their official
customs and policies. However, they are not vicariously liable under § 1983 for
1993]
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Because § 1983 does not have an express statute of limitations, the
courts must borrow the most analogous state limitations period for
§ 1983 claims.143 Prior to Wilson v. Garcia,144 the courts took several
approaches. Some characterized § 1983 claims uniformly and bor-
rowed one of the state's common law rights or residual time-bars.145
Others applied a limitations period for a specific statutory right.146
Still others characterized each action on a case-by-case basis, borrow-
ing the limitations provision that was most analogous to the facts of
the particular case.147
New York had a number of limitations statutes which could apply
to § 1983 actions. These included a six-year residual statute of limita-
tions,148 a three-year period for personal injury claims,149 a three-year
period to recover upon liability created by statute,150 a one-year plus
90-day period for actions against a municipality or its employees, 151 a
one-year period for certain enumerated intentional torts,152 and a
four-month period for review of administrative actions under Article
78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (hereinafter
CPLR).153 Other time-bars were also possible analogs depending on
the facts of the particular case.154
When the problem of which statute of limitations the courts should
borrow for § 1983 claims arose in New York, the issue was strongly
contested. Defendants argued that the courts should adopt the one-
year-and-ninety-day limitations period for actions against municipali-
ties or the four-month period for Article 78 proceedings. Plaintiffs ar-
their employees' individual acts. Id at 691. The states and their agencies have
Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit under § 1983. Quern v. Jordan, 440
U.S. 332 (1979) (holding that states may not be sued in federal court under § 1983);
Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989)(holding that states are
not "persons" under § 1983 and cannot be sued in state court under that section
without their consent). However, state officers can still be sued under § 1983 for
prospective relief. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Ex Parte Young, 209
U.S. 123 (1908). As a result, plaintiffs can obtain injunctive relief ordering state
officials to comply with federal law.
143. Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1980).
144. 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
145. See Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640, 643-48, 650-51 (10th Cir. 1984)(en banc), qff'd,
471 U.S. 261 (1985). See also Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275 n.35 (1985).
146. See Pauk v. Board of Trustees, 654 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1981)(borrowing New York's
limitations period for actions to recover upon liability created by statute), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982), overruled by Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
147. See Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 240 (1989).
148. N.Y. Crv. PRAC. L. & R. 213(1)(McKinney 1990).
149. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 214(5)(McKinney 1990).
150. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 214(2)(McKinney 1990).
151. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAw §§ 50-e, 50-i (McKinney 1986).
152. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 215(3)(McKinney 1990).
153. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 217 (McKinney 1990).
154. See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 214-a (two years plus six months for medical malprac-
tice claims), 213(2)(six years for contract claims)(McKinney 1990).
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gued for the various longer periods. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit finally resolved the dispute in Pauk v.
Board of Trustees.155 The Second Circuit held that CPLR 214(2),
which provides a three-year limitation for recovery upon a liability
conferred by statute,1 56 should apply to all § 1983 claims in New
York.157
The issue remained settled for less than three years. In 1985, the
United States Supreme Court decided Wilson v. Garcia.58 The
Supreme Court held that § 1983 actions should be characterized uni-
formly as personal injury actions for determining the most analogous
155. 654 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982), overruled by Wilson
v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
156. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 214 (McKinney 1990) provides, 'The following actions
must be commenced within three years:... an action to recover upon a liability,
penalty or forfeiture created or imposed by statute except as provided in sections
213 and 215 ......
157. Pauk v. Board of Trustees, 654 F.2d 856, 866 (2d Cir. 1981), cert denied, 455 U.S.
1000 (1982), overruled by Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985). The Second Cir-
cuit had previously applied CPLR 214(2) to § 1983 claims. In Chapman v. Hous-
ton Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600 (1979), the Supreme Court held that § 1983
does not create substantive rights. Chapman forced the Second Circuit to re-ex-
amine the application of CPLR 214(2) to § 1983 actions because CPLR 214(2) does
not apply to actions based on statutes that do not create new obligations. In the
first cases following Chapman, the Second Circuit refused to borrow the one-
year, ninety-day statute for actions against municipalities in favor of either CPLR
214(2) or the six-year residual limitations period. Taylor v. Mayone, 626 F.2d 247
(2d Cir. 1980); Quinn v. Syracuse Model Neighborhood Corp., 613 F.2d 438 (2d Cir.
1980). See Pauk, 654 F.2d at 861-62. In Pauk the Second Circuit finally adopted
the three-year period of CPLR 214(2) for all § 1983 actions. Id. at 866.
The plaintiff in Pauk was an assistant professor at Queens College, City Uni-
versity of New York. He alleged that the college and city education officials vio-
lated his First Amendment rights by denying him tenure and discharging him for
his union activities. Id- at 858-59. Pauk filed his complaint three years and nine
months after he received notice of the college's decision. Id. at 859.
In determining whether the action was time-barred, the Second Circuit noted
"the inexact fit of any of New York's statutes of limitations to § 1983 actions." Id.
at 861-62. The court also emphasized the need for uniformity in choosing a limita-
tions period. 1d. at 862, 863. The Second Circuit rejected the defendants' argu-
ments for the one-year, ninety-day limitations under the General Municipal Law
or the four-month limitations for Article 78 proceedings because such short peri-
ods would be inconsistent with the policies of § 1983. I& at 862-63. The court also
rejected the plaintiff's argument for adopting the six-year period for contract ac-
tions or the six-year residual statute of limitations. Id. at 863-64. Instead, the
court found that CPLR 214(2) remained the most analogous statute of limitations
for § 1983 claims because § 1983 provided more than an "additional remedy," or
alternatively, the Constitution could be considered a statute conferring liability
within the meaning of CPLR 214(2). Id. at 864-65. The Second Circuit, however,
emphasized that "[ilt would be preferable if Congress would end the uncertainty
that still exists in several states by legislating a uniform federal statute of limita-
tions." I&. at 866.
158. 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
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state statute of limitations.59 Wilson thus overruled Pauk.
Unfortunately, New York, like many states, had more than one
personal injury statute of limitations. CPLR 215(3) provided a one-
year time-bar on certain enumerated intentional torts,160 and CPLR
214(5) provided a three-year time-bar on actions to recover for per-
sonal injury.161 New York also had other limitations periods for spe-
cific personal injuries.162 After Wilson government defendants
argued that § 1983 actions were more like intentional torts so the one-
year statute of limitations was the most analogous. Plaintiffs asserted
that the three-year statute for general personal injury actions was
more appropriate.
In January 1986, Judge McCurn, in the Northern District of New
York, decided Okure v. Owens.163 He held that New York's three-
year, general personal injury statute was the most analogous limita-
tions period for § 1983 claims.164 Judge McCurn reasoned that the
general statute was more appropriate because § 1983 encompasses a
wide variety of claims, not all of which resemble intentional torts.165
He also determined that a one-year period would not provide plaintiffs
with sufficient time to assert their claims. The intentional tort limita-
tions statute would thus contravene Congress' desire to provide an ad-
equate remedy for violation of federal rights.166
Less than two months later, Judge Munson, who also sits in the
Northern District of New York,167 addressed the same issue. In Saun-
159. Id at 276. The Supreme Court stated that "the conflict, confusion, and uncer-
tainty concerning the appropriate statute of limitations to apply to this most im-
portant, and ubiquitous, civil rights statute provided compelling reasons for
granting certiorari." Id at 266. The Court also emphasized the need for" 'firmly
defined, easily applied rules"' for selecting limitations periods. Id. (quoting
Chadron v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 667 (1983)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
160. N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. 215(3)(McKinney 1990)(providing a one-year limitations
period to recover damages for assault, battery, false imprisonment, malicious
prosecution, libel, slander, false words causing special damages, or a violation of
the right of privacy).
161. In 1985,214(5) provided, "The following actions must be commenced within three
years: ... an action to recover damages for a personal injury except as provided in
sections 214-b [exposure to agent orange in Indo-China] and 215 [intentional torts]
....." N.Y. Crv. PRAC. L. & R. 214(5)(McKinney 1990)(see Historical and Statu-
tory Notes).
162. See N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. 214(6)(three years for nonmedical malpractice), 214-a
(two years plus six months for medical malpractice), 214-b (two years from dis-
covery of injury from phenoxy herbicides [agent orange] in Indo-China during
1962-1975) (McKinney 1990).
163. 625 F. Supp. 1568 (N.D.N.Y. 1986).
164. Id. at 1571.
165. Id. at 1570-71.
166. Id. at 1571. Judge McCurn's discussion in Okure illustrates the type of policy
analysis, traditionally left to legislatures, which borrowing forces judges to
undertake.
167. Judges McCurn and Munson both sit in Syracuse, New York. Their offices are
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ders v. New York,168 he held that the most analogous statute of limita-
tions for § 1983 claims was the intentional tort statute.169 However,
Judge Munson concluded that a one-year time-bar would contradict
federal policy so he also borrowed the three-year, general personal in-
jury statute of limitations.17o
The other judicial districts in the Second Circuit also struggled
with which personal injury statute should apply. In New York the
courts generally borrowed the three-year period under CPLR
214(5).171 Like Judge Munson, however, some judges believed that
New York's intentional torts statute of limitations was more analo-
gous to § 1983 claims. Nevertheless, they felt constrained to borrow
CPLR 214(5) by language in Pauk stating that a limitations period
which was less than two years would contravene federal policy.172
Unlike New York, Connecticut had a three-year statute of limitations
for intentional torts.173 Most of the judges in the Federal District for
Connecticut concluded that § 1983 claims were more analogous to in-
tentional torts so they borrowed Connecticut's intentional torts stat-
ute.174  However, at least one judge initially assumed that
Connecticut's limitations period for negligent and reckless torts'75
applied.176
Instead of the predictability and uniformity which the Supreme
Court hoped it would create, Wilson generated additional confusion in
the Second Circuit and elsewhere. 177 The Second Circuit eventually
heard an interlocutory appeal' 78 in Okure.179 Over the strong dissent
directly across the hall from one another. When Okure and Saunders were pend-
ing, the author was a judicial law clerk for Judge McCurn. The issue of which
New York statute of limitations the court should borrow for § 1983 claims was
hotly debated among the two judges' law clerks.
168. 629 F. Supp. 1067 (N.D.N.Y. 1986).
169. Id at 1069.
170. Id. at 1070.
171. See, eg., Ladson v. New York City Police Dep't, 614 F. Supp. 878 (S.D.N.Y. 1985);
Brandman v. North Shore Guidance Ctr., 636 F. Supp. 877 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); Lee v.
Coughlin, 643 F. Supp. 546 (W.D.N.Y. 1986); Brown v. Village of Albion, 128 Misc.
2d 586, 490 N.Y.S.2d 958 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
172. See Green v. Coughlin, 633 F. Supp. 1166,1169 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)(Goettel, J.); Lee v.
Coughlin, 643 F. Supp. 546, 549 (W.D.N.Y. 1986)(Telesca, J.)
173. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 52-577 (1991).
174. See DiVerniero v. Murphy, 635 F. Supp. 1531, 1533-34 (D. Conn. 1986); Weber v.
Amendola, 635 F. Supp. 1527 (D. Conn. 1985).
175. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 52584 (1991).
176. See Belcha v. DeBenedet, No. N-85-212, 1986 WL 7556 (D. Conn. Feb. 4,
1986)(Dorsey, J.)(declining to apply Wilson retroactively but assuming that the
two-year limitation for negligence torts would apply). Upon reconsideration,
Judge Dorsey changed his mind and applied the three-year limitations period.
Belcha v. DeBenedet, No. N-85-212, 1986 WL 15788 (D. Conn. June 18, 1986).
177. In her dissent in Wilson, Justice O'Connor foresaw this result. See Wilson v.
Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 286-87 (1985)(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
178. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)(1988); FED. R. APP. P. 5(a).
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of Judge Van Graafeiland,180 the court affirmed Judge McCurn's deci-
sion.18  Elsewhere, the First, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits also selected
general personal injury or residual state statutes.182 The Fifth, Sixth,
and Eleventh Circuits borrowed intentional torts statutes,1 8 3 including
one-year limitations periods. 8 4 Several circuits issued inconsistent
opinions. 8 5
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Okure, less than three
years after its decision in Wilson.186 In a unanimous opinion the
Supreme Court held that courts should borrow the state's general or
residual personal injury statute of limitations for § 1983 claims. 8 7
The plaintiff in Okure filed his complaint on November 13, 1985.188
He alleged that two State University of New York police officers ar-
rested him without cause and beat him in violation of his constitu-
tional rights. 8 9 The Supreme Court issued its decision on January 10,
1989.190 It took more than three years of litigation and three judicial
opinions, including a Supreme Court decision, just to determine
whether Mr. Okure's complaint was timely. As a result, the district
court and litigants had to wait over three years before the court could
begin considering the merits of the case.191 During that time the liti-
179. See Okure v. Owens, 816 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1987), aff'd, 488 U.S. 235 (1989).
180. See id, at 49-54 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
181. Id
182. See Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 241-42 & n.6 (1989).
183. See id at 241 & n.5.
184. See Mulligan v. Hazard, 777 F.2d 340, 344 (6th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 476 U.S.
1174 (1986); Gates v. Spinks, 771 F.2d 916,920 (5th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 475 U.S.
1065 (1986).
185. See Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 242 n.5 (1989).
186. Owens v. Okure, 485 U.S. 958 (1988)(granting certiorari).
187. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 236 (1989). The Supreme Court reasoned that bor-
rowing an intentional torts limitations period would continue to create confusion
and unpredictability because many states have multiple intentional torts statutes
of limitations. Id. at 242-49. The Court also noted that § 1983 encompasses a wide
variety of claims some of which do not resemble common law intentional torts.
IM at 249.
188. Id at 237.
189. The Supreme Court described Mr. Okure's allegations as follows:
Okure alleged that, on January 27, 1984, the officers unlawfully arrested
him on the SUNY campus in Albany and charged him with disorderly
conduct. The complaint stated that Okure was "forcibly transported" to
a police detention center, "battered and beaten by [the police officers]
and forced to endure great emotional distress, physical harm, and embar-
rassment." As a result of the arrest and beating, Okure claimed, he "sus-
tained personal injuries, including broken teeth and a sprained finger,
mental anguish, shame, humiliation, legal expenses and the deprivation
of his constitutional rights."
Id. (citations to the record omitted). See also Okure v. Owens, 625 F. Supp. 1568,
1569 (N.D.N.Y. 1986), off'd, 816 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1987), aff'd, 488 U.S. 235 (1989).
190. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 235 (1989).
191. If the district court does not certify an interlocutory appeal after deciding that a
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gants' lives were disrupted; they and the courts were forced to expend
significant time and resources litigating the limitations issue; and the
evidence was three years older by the time the various courts finally
determined that Mr. Okure's claims were timely.
Moreover, Owens v. Okure is not a satisfactory solution to the prob-
lem of borrowing a limitations period for § 1983 claims. In both Wil-
son and Okure, the Supreme Court focused on the need for a practical
approach to eliminate confusion and uncertainty, but the Court failed
to address important equitable concerns. Okure solves only the prob-
lem of predictability within states; in each state the state's general or
residual personal injury statute of limitations applies. Okure does not
address the problem of uniformity among the states. A person's right
to redress violations of constitutional and other important federal
rights under § 1983 still varies from state to state depending on the
length of the state's general, personal injury statute of limitations.
The states' statutes currently range from one 92 to six years.193 A per-
son in North Dakota'94 or Maine' 95 who has been denied his or her
First Amendment rights has six years in which to assert a claim, but a
person in Kentucky'9 6 or Louisiana 97 loses the same First Amend-
ment claim after only one year.19 S Such disparate treatment is partic-
ularly troubling when the individual's federally protected civil rights
are at stake.199
claim is timely, it decides the merits. A losing defendant can then challenge the
district court's timeliness ruling on direct appeal after a final judgment on the
merits. However, the district court and litigants will have wasted valuable time
and resources litigating the merits if the court of appeals finds that the claim was
originally time-barred. For this reason interlocutory appeals on timeliness issues
are common even though interlocutory appeals are generally not favored in fed-
eral practice.
192. Whether a one-year time-bar violates the federal policy underlying § 1983 may
still be an issue.
193. NYSBA REPORT, supra note 1, at 10.
194. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-16(5)(1991).
195. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 752 (West 1980).
196. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.140(1)(a) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992).
197. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 3492 (West 1992 Supp.).
198. See also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340(3)(West Supp. 1992)(one year); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 260, § 2A (West Supp. 1992)(three years); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 516.120(4)(Vernon 1952)(five years); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-2 (West 1987)(two
years); N.Y. Cirv. PRAc. L. & R. 214(5)(McKinney 1990)(three years); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 5524(2)(Supp. 1992)(two years); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 31
§ 5298(2)(1991)(one year).
199. See NYSBA REPORT, supra note 1, at 12 (calling for congressional action to rem-
edy the problem); Siegel, Practice Commentary, supra note 1, at 99 ("[Ilt must
strike any observer as incongruous that something as fundamentally 'federal' as a




B. Borrowing the State's Tolling Provisions
The state's tolling law may further complicate the problem of de-
termining whether a federal claim is time-barred. When the court
borrows a state statute of limitations, it must also apply the state's
tolling rules unless they are inconsistent with federal law.200 The
Supreme Court has reasoned that the court relies on the state's bal-
ancing of interests when it borrows the state's limitations period.
Therefore, the state's exceptions to its statutes of limitations "are an
integral part of a complete limitations policy."201 However, the
200. Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980)(applying New York's tolling law
to a § 1983 claim). See also Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc. 421 U.S. 454,
465 (1975).
201. Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 488 (1980). The Supreme Court's rea-
soning in Tomanio is similar to the Court's rationale for applying state tolling
provisions in diversity cases. See Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co.,
337 U.S. 530, 532-34 (1949)(affirmed by Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740
(1980)).
The Supreme Court has not, however, treated accrual of federal question
claims the same as accrual of diversity claims. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3
provides that a civil action in federal court "is commenced by filing a complaint
with the court." The Supreme Court has interpreted Rule 3 narrowly in diversity
cases but not in federal question cases. In Walker the Court held that state law
governing when an action commences for tolling the statute of limitations in di-
versity cases does not directly conflict with Rule 3. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.,
446 U.S. 740, 752 (1980). Qf Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965) (holding that a
controlling Federal Rule of Civil Procedure applies unless it is unconstitutional
or outside the scope of the Rules Enabling Act.) Rule 3 merely measures other
litigation time periods such as when a summary judgment motion may be
brought. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750-51 (1980). Because the
state's accrual law was an integral part of the state's statute of limitations in
Walker, the federal court had to apply the state's accrual law for determining
whether the state claim was timely. Id at 748-49, 752-53. The Supreme Court
refused to consider whether the state's law or Rule 3 would control accrual of a
federal claim. Id at 751 n.11.
The Supreme Court finally addressed the issue in West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35
(1987). In DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983), the
Supreme Court borrowed the six-month statute of limitations in § 10(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act for certain hybrid actions under the Management
Labor Relations Act. However, the Court subsequently refused to borrow the
six-month service requirement for commencing an action under § 10(b). West,
481 U.S. at 38, 39-40. Stating that the Court had no intention of displacing the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when it borrowed the statute of limitations in
DelCostello, id. at 38, the Court held that a federal question claim is timely if it is
filed pursuant to Rule 3 within the borrowed statute of limitations. Id.
The Supreme Court distinguished its treatment of diversity cases on federal-
ism grounds:
When the underlying cause of action is based on state law, and fed-
eral jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, state law not only
provides the appropriate period of limitations but also determines
whether service must be effected within that period.... Respect for the
State's substantive decision that actual service is a component of the poli-
cies underlying the statute of limitations requires that the service rule in
[Vol. 72:454
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Supreme Court has also cautioned that the court must "borrow only
what is necessary to fill in the gap left by Congress."20 2
To evaluate consistency with federal policy, the court must analyze
and compare the policies underlying both the state's tolling provisions
and the federal act.203 Then the court must examine the facts of the
particular case to determine whether they fall within the state's toll-
ing rules. This requires learning the state's tolling law. Although
many states have codified tolling provisions,204 state tolling rules
which are developed or interpreted in case law can be difficult to find
and apply.205 Moreover, the state legislatures and courts adopt their
tolling rules to protect state rights, not federal rights. 206 In contrast,
a diversity suit "be considered part and parcel of the statute of limita-
tions..... This requirement, naturally, does not apply to federal-ques-
tion cases.
Id. at 39 n.4 (citations omitted). Discussing its previous decisions which required
the lower courts to borrow the state's tolling rules in federal question cases, the
Supreme Court emphasized that "[t]he governing principle is that we borrow
only what is necessary to fill the gap left by Congress." Id. at 40 n.6; see also id at
39-40 ("Inevitably our resolution of cases or controversies requires us to close in-
terstices in federal law from time to time, but when it is necessary for us to bor-
row a statute of limitations for a federal cause of action, we borrow no more than
necessary.")
202. West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35, 40 n.6 (1987); see also i& at 39-40.
203. Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478,487 (1980). See also Minnesota Mining
and Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311, 321 (1965)(quoting
Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 427 (1965)("In order to deter-
mine ... ['whether congressional purpose is effectuated by tolling the statute of
limitations in given circumstances], we must examine 'the purposes and policies
underlying the limitation provision, the Act itself, and the remedial scheme de-
veloped for the enforcement of the rights given by the Act.' ").
204. See supra note 19.
205. See Marcus, Memorandum, supra note 1, at 11-12. Even in states with statutory
tolling provisions, courts generally have equitable power to develop additional
tolling rules through common law. See Fischer, supra note 11, at 8-14 (discussing
equitable tolling in California).
206. The Supreme Court explained the policy for borrowing the state's tolling provi-
sions as follows:
Although any statute of limitations is necessarily arbitrary, the length of
the period allowed for instituting suit inevitably reflects a value judg-
ment concerning the point at which the interests in favor of protecting
valid claims are outweighed by the interests in prohibiting the prosecu-
tion of stale ones. In virtually all statutes of limitations the chronologi-
cal length of the limitation period is interrelated with provisions
regarding tolling, revival, and questions of application. In borrowing a
state period of limitation for application to a federal cause of action, a
federal court is relying on the State's wisdom in setting a limit, and ex-
ceptions thereto, on the prosecution of a closely analogous claim.
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454,463-64 (1975). Even where
the federal claim is "closely analogous" to a particular state claim, however, the
state's statutory tolling provisions are usually general rules which apply to most
of the state's limitations periods. See, e.g., N.Y. Crv. PRAC. L. & R. 207 (defend-
ant's absence from the state or residence under a false name); 208 (infancy or
1,993]
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federal tolling law is fashioned to protect federal rights.207 Accord-
ingly, courts may be inclined to find that a state tolling provision con-
travenes federal policy even though applying the state's statute of
limitations does not.208
Borrowing state tolling law thus generates additional unpredict-
ability and litigation.209 It also leads to more disparity from state to
state because each state has different tolling rules. 210
C. Borrowing Federal Statutes of Limitations
1. Choosing the Most Analogous Federal Limitations Period
Borrowing state law is the general rule.2 1 1 However, in some cases,
the courts borrow a statute of limitations from another federal stat-
ute.212 This occurs when applying state law would create practical
problems and conflict with federal policy.2 13 The Supreme Court has
emphasized that borrowing a federal time-bar is a "closely circum-
scribed exception to the general rule."2 14 Nevertheless, courts borrow
a federal limitations period "when a rule from elsewhere in federal
law clearly provides a closer analogy than available state statutes, and
insanity); 210(a),(b)(death of claimant or person liable)(McKinney 1990 & Supp.
1993). Moreover, the federal claim is frequently not "closely analogous" to a par-
ticular state claim. See supra text accompanying notes 104-06.
The Supreme Court's rationale is particularly tenuous when the court bor-
rows the state's common law tolling rules for a federal claim. In this situation a
state court, and not the state's legislature, is balancing state policies for a particu-
lar state claim in a specific dispute. If it is inappropriate for a federal court to
balance similar federal interests for federal claims, it is particularly inappropriate
to apply a state court's policy determinations for a state right to a federal right.
207. See Marcus, Memorandum, supra note 1, at 12.
208. See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946)(applying the federal equita-
ble tolling rule for fraudulent concealment to a federal equity claim which would
be time-barred under the state's statute of limitations); Special Project, supra
note 1, at 1055-56; Marcus, Memorandum, supra note 1, at 11. See also N.Y. ST. L.
DIG., supra note 8, at 2 (characterizing the area as "murky").
209. See NYSBA REPORT, supra note 1, at 11; N.Y. ST. L. DIG., supra note 8, at 2
("There is caselaw with general indications that tolls apply, but with only the
most casual guideposts, if they can be called guideposts at all, by which to deter-
mine the circumstances that will invoke a toll and what toll will be invoked in the
circumstances.").
210. NYSBA REPORT, supra note 1, at 10.
211. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2778
(1991).
212. See, e.g., id at 2782; Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc. 483 U.S.
143 (1987); DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983);
McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221 (1958).
213. The courts assume that" 'Congress would [not] choose to adopt state rules at odds
with the purpose or operation of federal substantive law."' See Lampf, Pleva,
Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2778 (1991)(quoting
DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 161 (1983)).
214. Reed v. United Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319, 324 (1989).
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when the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation
make the rule a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial
lawmaking."'15 Accordingly, courts and practitioners must scrutinize
both state and federal statutes of limitations, as well as the underlying
causes of action, to select the most appropriate limitations period.
As with borrowing state law, the Supreme Court has provided only
minimal guidance for practitioners and the courts. Again, the first
step is to decide whether a uniform limitations period should apply.216
If uniformity is unnecessary, the most analogous state statute of limi-
tations for each individual claim applies. If uniformity is more appro-
priate, one must then determine whether federal or state law2 17
should provide the limitations period.218
215. Id
216. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc. 483 U.S. at 143, 147 (1987).
See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
217. The Supreme Court has recognized that characterizing a claim uniformly for bor-
rowing a state limitations period will not create national uniformity. However,
this fact alone will not override the presumption in favor of borrowing state law.
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275 (1985)(quoting Board of Regents v. Tomanio,
446 U.S. 478,489 (1980)("[The need for national uniformity has not been held to
warrant the displacement of state statutes of limitations for civil rights actions
... ' "). See also Reed v. United Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319 (1989)(borrowing the
state's limitation period for employee actions under § 101(a)(2) of the Labor-Man-
agement Reporting and Disclosure Act). The Court has focused primarily on the
practicalities of choosing a limitations period rather than on interstate fairness.
Theoretically, a uniform characterization will provide predictability and avoid
unnecessary litigation within each state. But see discussion supra text accompa-
nying notes 141-99.
218. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143,147 (1987). At
the time of writing, the Supreme Court's latest discussion on choosing statutes of
limitations for federal claims is found in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Pe-
tigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991). The same basic guidelines from Mal-
ley-Duff& Asso., Inc are set forth in the plurality portion of the opinion written
by Justice Blactunn and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White
and Marshall. Id- at 2779. See Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc. 483 U.S. 143, 147
(1987). Justices O'Connor and Kennedy in their dissenting opinions apparently
agree with the plurality's analytical approach but disagree with the plurality's
result and retroactive application. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. at 2785-2788 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting); id at 2788-90 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens believes
that the Rules of Decision Act requires the Court to borrow state law. See
DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S 151, 172-73 (1983)(Ste-
vens, J., dissenting); Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. at 2784 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Souter, who joined Justice Stevens' dissent in Gilbertson, agrees that bor-
rowing a federal limitations period constitutes unwarranted judicial legislating.
See Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. at 2783-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Finally, Justice
Scalia believes that state law applies of its own force unless Congress preempts it.
See i&L at 2783 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in judgment); Malley-Duff &
Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. at 158-65 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). When apply-
ing state law would interfere with federal policy, Justice Scalia would find that
no limitations period should apply. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. at 2783; Malley-Duff &
Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. at 163-64.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:454
Writing for the plurality in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Pe-
tigrow v. Gilbertson,219 Justice Blackmun stated that the "geographic
character of the claim" should be given "particular weight" in deciding
whether to borrow federal or state law.22 0 For causes of action which
may involve multi-state transactions, borrowing a federal statute of
limitations is more desirable because it provides greater uniformity
than borrowing state law. A uniform federal time-bar prevents forum
shopping and confusion over which state's limitations period applies,
particularly in multi-party, complex litigation.221 For example, the
Supreme Court has applied a federal statute of limitations to civil en-
forcement claims under RIC0222 and securities fraud claims under
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act22S and SEC Rule 10b-5.224
Borrowing a federal time-bar may also be more appropriate for hy-
brid225 actions.2 2 6 Where interdependent claims are combined, finding
one state limitations period which does not contravene the federal pol-
icy of one of the claims will be more difficult.227 If more than one
219. 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991).
220. Id- at 2779.
221. See id- at 2779 (quoting Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs.,Inc., 483
U.S. 143, 154 (1987).
222. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143 (1987)(applying
the four-year statute of limitations for civil enforcement actions under the Clay-
ton Act to civil enforcement actions under RICO).
223. The Supreme Court has recognized an implied, private right of action under
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and SEC Rule lOb-5,17
C.F.R. 240.10b-5, for fraud in the purchase and sale of securities. Lampf, Pleva,
Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S.Ct. 2773, 2779 (1991); Herman &
MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
224. Lampf, Pleva, IUpkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991)(ap-
plying the statute of limitations in § 9(e) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act to
implied actions under § 10(b) of the same Act).
225. Hybrid actions contain two or more closely related, interdependent claims which
are usually brought in the same suit. For example, when an employee loses a
labor grievance/arbitration, the employee will generally sue the employer for
breach of the collective bargaining agreement under § 301 of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act and the union for breach of its duty of fair representation,
which is implied under the National Labor Relations Act. See DelCostello v. In-
ternational Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
226. See DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151,161-62 (1983) (ap-
plying a federal statute of limitations to employee hybrid suits under the Labor
Management Relations Act for the employer's breach the collective bargaining
agreement and the union's breach of its duty of fair representation). Cf McAl-
lister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221, 224 (1958) (applying a federal limi-
tations period under the Jones Act to unseaworthiness actions under general
admiralty law).
227. For example, in DelCostello the Supreme Court refused to borrow the state's lim-
itations period for vacating an arbitration award for § 301/fair representation
cases under the Labor Management Relations Act. The states' statutes of limita-
tions for vacating arbitration awards are very short, usually measured in months
instead of years. In a hybrid action, however, the employee must "evaluate the
adequacy of the union's representation .... retain counel,... investigate substan-
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limitations period is applied to interdependent claims, practical litiga-
tion problems may arise which could also thwart federal policy.2 28
Furthermore, the court may choose a federal limitations period if
the most analogous state statute of limitations is too short. A particu-
larly short period is more likely to impair federal policy by preventing
effective enforcement of the underlying right or settlement. For ex-
ample, the Supreme Court has refused to apply a state time-bar to
EEOC enforcement actions under Title VII.229 The Court concluded
that applying a state limitations period would unduly restrict the
EEOC's mission of investigating and settling employment discrimina-
tion disputes before formal litigation.230 Similarly, in DelCostello the
Court borrowed the six-month statute of limitations governing unfair
labor practices under the National Labor Relations Act for certain hy-
brid actions under the Labor Management Relations Act, instead of a
ninety-day, state provision for vacating arbitration awards.23 1
Even if borrowing federal law appears more desirable, the analysis
is not complete. The general presumption in favor of borrowing state
law still requires that "an analogous federal source truly affords a
'closer fit' with the cause of action at issue than does any available
state-law source."23 2 How litigants and courts make this determina-
tion with any degree of certainty and economy is unclear. One re-
course is to compare the purposes and elements of the underlying
federal claim with the state and federal analogs.233 However, Justice
Blackmun conceded in Gilbertson that the factors to be considered
will vary depending on the underlying claim and the possible
analogs.234
tial matters that were not at issue in the [grievance/arbitration] proceeding, and
... frame his suit," all within the limitations period. DelCostello v. International
Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 166 (1983). The Supreme Court concluded that
borrowing the state's arbitration time-bars would create practical problems which
would impair the employee's ability to vindicate his or her rights.Id See also id
at 166 n.16 ('esides its brevity, use of an arbitration limitations period raises
knotty problems of categorization and consistency.")
228. For example, res judicata and collateral estoppel will generally force the plaintiff
to bring a hybrid action within the shortest applicable limitations period. If this
period is too short, the policies of the interdependent claim will be impaired. See
DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164-65 (1983). Cf
McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221, 224 (1958).
229. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 (1977).
230. Id. at 368-69.
231. DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 166 (1983)(conclud-
ing that 90 days was too short to provide an employee with sufficient time to
vindicate his or her rights).
232. Lampf, Pleva, IApkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2779
(1991).





Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has at least simplified the bor-
rowing process for rights of action implied under federal statutes. If a
federal statute contains an explicit cause of action which has an ex-
plicit statute of limitations, that limitations period will also apply to an
implied right arising under the same statute.= For example, the
Supreme Court borrowed the limitations provision in section 9(e) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934236 for securities fraud actions im-
plied under section 10(b) of the same Act.237 Borrowing state law
should only be considered if the express cause of action is not analo-
gous to the implied right 238 or, presumably, if applying the statutory
period would contradict the purposes of the implied right.239 This ex-
ception to the presumption in favor of borrowing state law is based on
the assumption that Congress would have reached the same balance of
interests had it considered a limitations period for the implied right of
action.240
2. Problems with Borrowing Federal Statutes of Limitations
Theoretically, borrowing limitations periods from federal statutes
creates greater uniformity and fairness than borrowing from state
law.2 41 Moreover, Congress, and not the states, has balanced the inter-
ests of repose and prosecution. For these reasons, one might conclude
that borrowing federal law should become the general rule.2 42
Borrowing from federal law is not the answer, however. Courts
must still determine which federal statute of limitations is the best
analog. Because more than one possibility usually exists, disagree-
ments among the courts will continue to generate confusion and lack
of uniformity.24 3 In such cases uniformity and predictability will only
occur when the Supreme Court ultimately chooses one federal limita-
tions period. Some critics also warn that Congress has not enacted
enough statutes of limitations to provide adequate choices. 244 Yet,
having a number of choices only enhances the uncertainty and the
problem of judicial legislating. In choosing the closest analog, the
235. Id. at 2780.
236. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e)(1988).
237. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2782 n.9
(1991).
238. Id. at 2780, 2781-82.
239. See id. at 2788 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
240. Id. at 2780.
241. See NYSBA REPORT, supra note 1, at 3.
242. See, Kaulbach, supra note 45 (arguing that the presumption in favor of borrowing
state limitations periods should be abandoned); Note, Laches in Federal Substan-
tive Law: Relation to Statutes of Limitations, 56 B.U. L. REV. 970, 984-87, 988
(1976)(arguing that the courts should look to federal statutes of limitations for
applying laches).
243. Special Project, supra note 1, at 1081.
244. NYSBA REPORT, supra note 1, at 3.
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judge must, at least, consider whether the interests in repose and pros-
ecution are adequately served. Moreover, choices increase the tempta-
tion to decide what period of time is appropriate for the particular
cause of action and then choose whichever analog has the closest limi-
tations period, instead of actually looking for the most appropriate
statute.24 5 Even implied rights of action arising under federal statutes
with express time-bars can be problematic. The statute in question
may have more than one explicit limitations period,246 and different
causes of action may further different statutory goals.247
The Supreme Court's decision in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Przspis &
Petigrow v. Gilbertsonm24 illustrates these problems. The federal
courts have long recognized an implied, private right of action for se-
curities fraud under section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act
and SEC Rule 10b-5.249 Prior to Gilbertson, courts and legal scholars
had struggled for years over what limitations period should apply.
Some courts borrowed state law, applying either the state's common-
law fraud or "blue sky"250 statute of limitations.251 Other courts held
that a uniform federal limitations period was required because of the
multi-state nature of section 10(b) actions.252
The Supreme Court finally agreed to decide the issue in October
245. See Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1394 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner,
J., concurring) ("[W]e have the essential condition for standardless, discretionary
judgment .... "), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 2887 (1991).
246. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773
(1991).
247. See id. at 2789 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
248. 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991).
249. Id. at 2779 (noting that private actions implied under § 10(b) of the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act have been allowed for "nearly half a century"); Herman &
MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
250. Blue Sky laws regulate securities offerings and sales. They are designed to pro-
tect citizens from investment fraud. BLACKS LAw DICTIoNARY 173 (6th ed. 1990).
According to BLACKS LAw DICTIONARY, the name "blue sky law" derives from
"speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of blue sky."
Id. (citing State v. Cushing, 15 A.2d 740 (Me. 1940)).
251. See Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines, and Jonas, 913 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1990)(ap-
plying the state's common law fraud limitations period); Nesbit v. McNeil, 896
F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1990)(applying the state's common law fraud limitations pe-
riod); Corwin v. Marney, Orton Investments, 843 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1988)(applying
the state's general fraud limitations period); Durham v. Business Management
Assocs., 847 F.2d 1505 (11th Cir. 1988)(applying the state's blue sky limitations
period); O'Hara v. Kovens, 625 F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1124
(1981)(applying the state's blue sky limitations period); Forrestal Village, Inc. v.
Graham, 551 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1977)(applying the state's blue sky limitations
period).
252. See In re Data Access Systems Securities Litigation, 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir.)(en
bane), cert denied sub nom. Vitiello v. I. Kahlowski & Co., 488 U.S. 849 (1988);
Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385 (7th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S.
Ct. 2887 (1991).
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1990.20 The plaintiffs in Gilbertson brought suit under section 10(b)
against the New Jersey law firm and other defendants involved in pre-
paring the offering memorandum for a number of limited partner-
ships in which the plaintiffs invested. The partnerships failed, and the
IRS denied the plaintiffs certain tax benefits which the defendants
had allegedly promised. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants'
misrepresentations in the offering memorandum induced their
investment.254
Following more than thirty-years' precedent in the Ninth Cir-
cuit,25 5 the United States District Court for the District of Oregon
held that Oregon's two-year limitations period for fraud applied to the
plaintiffs' claims.25 6 The Ninth Circuit affirmed application of the
state's statute of limitations.257 The Supreme Court reversed. The
Court held that a uniform federal limitations period should apply to
section 10(b) claims and looked to the Securities Exchange Act for the
most analogous statute of limitations.258
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, however, did not provide one,
clear choice. The Act contains a number of explicit causes of action
with separate statutes of limitations. Several sections provide that a
claim must be brought within one year of discovering the facts consti-
tuting a violation, but no more than three years after the violation.259
Each provision, however, has slightly different language. Another sec-
tion of the Act provides a two-year repose period rather than three
years.260 Still another provision sets a five-year limitations period for
insider trading.261
The Securities Exchange Commission argued that the five-year pe-
riod for insider trading, which Congress added in 1988, provided the
closest analogy to 10(b) claims and Congress' most recent balancing of
253. Lampf, Pleva, IUpkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 242
(1990)(granting certiorari).
254. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2776-77
(1991).
255. See id. at 2785 & n.1 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
256. Id. at 2777. The district court's opinion is not reported.
257. Reitz v. Leasing Consultants Assocs., 895 F.2d 1418 (1990)(judgment entry)(text
in Westlaw). See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S.
Ct. 2773, 2777 (1991). The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of sum-
mary judgment to the defendants and remanded on the issue of when the plain-
tiffs discovered or should have discovered the alleged fraud. The Ninth Circuit's
opinion is unpublished but can be found on Westlaw under the Federal Reporter
citation.
258. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2778
(1991).
259. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77m, 78i(e), 78r(c)(1988).
260. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)(1988).
261. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1(b)(4)(1988).
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the relevant interests.262 A plurality of the Supreme Court Justices,
however, adopted a one-year period from discovery with a three-year
repose statute.20 3 Justice Scalia reluctantly concurred after deciding
that the plurality's approach was the least offensive alternative to de-
termining a limitations period for implied causes of action.264 Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy did not object to the one-year-from-discovery
provision. However, they asserted that imposing a three-year repose
statute on plaintiffs would contradict Congress' policy of deterring se-
curities fraud and providing an effective remedy for victims.265
In addition to the practical problems of choosing the most analo-
gous federal statute of limitations, the appropriate balancing of inter-
ests is not made when the court borrows federal law. Instead of
providing general limitations periods, Congress has enacted statutes of
limitations for specific federal rights, which are usually narrowly
262. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2777-78
(1991).
263. Id at 2782. The Supreme Court rejected the five-year period, finding that Con-
gress enacted the longer limitations period to enhance protection against insider
trading. The Court found no indication that Congress intended to give greater
protection for other violations of the Act. Id at 2781. The Supreme Court also
rejected the one-and-two-year limitations period because 15 U.S.C. § 78i "requires
the disgorgement of unlawful profits and differs in focus from § 10(b). .. ." Id at
2780 n.5. The Court apparently determined that the one-and-three-year period
was more analogous to § 10(b) claims because it applies to a number of the Act's
other causes of action. The Justices also concluded that § 9,15 U.S.C. § 78i (1988),
and § 18,15 U.S.C. § 78r (1988), to which the one-and-three-year provision applies,
have the same "focus" as § 10(b). Id. Sections 9 and 18 regulate securities trans-
actions and impose reporting requirements to prevent manipulation of stock
prices. Id However, the dissent notes that these provisions are narrowly fo-
cused. Section 10(b) is a general remedy which is fashioned after common law
fraud and designed to deter "all forms of securities fraud." Id at 2789 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting).
264. 1d at 2783 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in judgment). Justice Scalia first
criticized the federal courts' practice of "inventing" causes of action. Conceding
that the Supreme Court had already recognized an implied right of action under
§ 10(b), he concluded that applying no time-bar would create irrational and un-
just results although finding no limitations period might deter the courts from
creating causes of action in the future. Alternatively, the Court could "imply" a
limitations period, but such judicial legislating would be "too lawless to imagine."
Id.
265. Id at 2790. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O'Connor, concluded that the one-
year-from-discovery period adequately balanced the investor's interests while
preventing stale claims. Id. However, he stressed that the underlying basis for a
§ 10(b) claim is fraud. Accordingly, "[t]he real burden on most investors.., is the
initial matter of discovering whether a violation of the securities laws occurred at
all .... '[C]oncealment is inherent in most securities fraud cases."' Id at 2789
(citation omitted). Justice Kennedy concluded that the "practicalities of litiga-
tion" and "the simple facts of business life" would prevent many injured inves-
tors from discovering the violation and filing suit within the three-year repose
statute. A three-year absolute time-bar would thus thwart Congress' desire to
provide an effective remedy for securities fraud. Id at 2789-90.
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drawn.266 For each limitations period, Congress has balanced the in-
terests in asserting that specific right against the need for repose.
Congress has not considered all the analogous federal rights to which
the limitations period could be applied in a borrowing scenario.
Rather, the court is left to balance the appropriate policy interests.267
Even with implied statutory causes of action, the court must guess
which limitations period Congress would have selected. When a
number of possibilities exist, the temptation is great to first decide the
appropriate period of repose and then look for an analog with that
time period. Moreover, the problem of unfair surprise to actual and
potential litigants is just as great when the court borrows a new fed-
eral limitations period as when it borrows state law because the new
federal period will be retroactive.268
D. No Applicable Statute of Limitations
Finally, the courts have occasionally decided that when Congress is
silent, no limitations period should apply.269 For example, in Occiden-
tal life Insurance Company v. EEOC, the Supreme Court held that
EEOC enforcement actions under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act are not subject to a statute of limitations.270 The Court concluded
that applying a state statute of limitations would put undue pressure
266. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 168
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)("Federal statutes of limitations... are
almost invariably tied to specific causes of action."); PAUL M. BATOR Er AL., HART
& WEcHsLER's TuE FEDERAL CouRTs AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 533 (3d ed.
1988)("Federal legislation, on the whole, has been conceived and drafted on an ad
hoc basis to accomplish limited objectives.").
267. In his concurring opinion in Malley-Duf & Assocs., Inc., Justice Scalia explained:
In deciding whether to borrow a federal statute that clearly does not ap-
ply by its terms, however, we genuinely will have to determine whether,
for example, the Clayton Act's limitations period will better serve the
policies underlying civil actions under RICO than the limitations period
covering criminal actions under RICO, or whether either will do the job
better than state limitations upon actions for economic injury. That
seems to me to be quintessentially the kind of judgment to be made by a
legislature."
Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 169
(1987)(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
268. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2782
(1991). Congress has attempted to legislatively overrule the retroactive effect for
SEC § 10(b) cases. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-i. See supra note 140.
269. See Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 (1977)(EEOC enforcement ac-
tions under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); County of Oneida v. Oneida
Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 240-44 (1985)(federal common law actions by Indians
to protect tribal property rights); Public Interest Research Group v. United States
Metals Refining Co., 681 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.N.J. 1987)(citizen enforcement ac-
tions under the Clean Water Act), overruled by Public Interest Research Group
v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc. 913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1990).
270. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 366 (1977).
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on the EEOC's administrative duties.27 1 Although such rulings are
rare, the possibility that no time-bar applies must be considered.
The practice of borrowing limitations periods for federal claims
thus puts a undue burden on both the judiciary and litigants. When
Congress neglects to enact a statute of limitations for a federal claim,
litigants and judges must scrutinize both federal and state statutes for
the most appropriate analog. The task can be daunting, depending on
the number of possibilities. Litigants and judges may have to choose
among a number of close analogs or select one where no close compar-
ison exists. They must also examine the underlying federal cause of
action and its legislative history to make sure that Congress did not, in
fact, intend that an indefinite limitations period apply.
The resulting uncertainty creates both practical and equitable
problems. Scarce time and resources are spent determining and liti-
gating limitations issues before the merits can be addressed. Judges
must make policy determinations which are better left to Congress,
and both litigants and courts are subject to surprise by subsequent lim-
itations litigation.272 More importantly, disagreements among the
courts and the general practice of borrowing state limitations periods
mean that individuals' federal rights vary from circuit to circuit, state
to state, and sometimes within the same state. This confusion, ineq-
uity, and cost in time and resources has prompted repeated calls for
Congressional action.273 Congress finally responded by enacting sec-
tion 313 of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990.274
IV. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 28 U.S.C. § 1658
The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990275 is composed of eight ti-
tles which cover a wide range of topics. 2 76 The federal fallback statute
271. Idi at 368-71.
272. See Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1394 (7th Cir. 1990)(Posner,
J., concurring), cerL denied, 111 S. Ct. 2887 (1991).
273. See, ag., Marcus, Memorandum, supra note 1, at 5; NYSBA REPORT, supra note 1,
at 16; Siegel, Practice Commentary, supra note 1, at 99-100; Special Project, supra
note 1, at 1105. Cf. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S.
143, 170 (1987)(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)(suggesting that applying no
limitations period to civil RICO claims "might even prompt Congress to enact a
limitations period that it believes 'appropriate,' a judgment far more within its
competence than ours.").
274. Section 313 is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (Supp. 1991).
275. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990).
276. Congress passed the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 on October 27, 1990, dur-
ing an all-night session. Each title is a separate act. Title I, The Civil Justice
Reform Act of 1990, is designed to help the federal courts reduce the cost and
delay of civil litigation. It requires each district court to create a "civil justice
expense and delay reduction plan." 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. 1991). Title II,
The Federal Judgeship Act of 1990, establishes 11 new circuit judgeships and 74
new district court judgeships. 28 U.S.C. §§ 44(1), 133. Title III, The Federal
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of limitations is included in Title III, the Federal Courts Study Com-
mittee Implementation Act of 1990.277 Title III adopts a number of
the Federal Courts Study Committee's noncontroversial recommenda-
tions.278 These reforms, including section 313, are designed to "sub-
stantially improve the efficiency and fairness of federal court
operations."279
Congress established the Federal Courts Study Committee 28 0 in
late 1988, in response to growing "congestion, delay, expense, and ex-
pansion" within the federal courts.281 The Committee was directed to
study the problems facing the federal courts, develop a "long-range
plan" for the federal judiciary, and recommend changes in existing
federal law.28 2 Its members included representatives from the three
Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990, enacts some of the Federal
Courts Study Committee's proposals for federal court reform. Pub. L. No. 101-
650, §§ 301-325, 104 Stat. at 5104-21 (codified in various sections of Title 28 of the
United States Code). Title IV, The Judicial Discipline and Removal Reform Act
of 1990, deals with judicial impeachment and discipline. Title IV creates the Na-
tional Commission on Judicial Impeachment to study discipline and removal of
federal judges and to make recommendations to Congress. Pub. L. No. 101-650,
§§ 401-418; 104 Stat. at 5122-27 (1990)(codified in various sections of Title 28 of the
United States Code). The other four sections of the Judicial Improvements Act
do not deal with the federal courts. They involve a variety of topics ranging from
computer software to television violence.
277. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5104, 5115 (1990) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (Supp.
1991)).
278. H.R. REP. No. 101-734, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 15, rep7inted in 1990 U.S.C.C-.N.
6860, 6861.
279. Id. Title III includes a number of important changes in addition to the fallback
statute of limitations. Section 310 codifies pendant and ancillary jurisdiction
under the name "supplemental jurisdiction." It also overrules Finley v. United
States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989), by authorizing pendant party jurisdiction in federal
question cases. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (Supp. 1991). Section 311 amends the general
venue statute. It eliminates the plaintiff's residence as a basis for venue in diver-
sity cases. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(Supp. 1991). Section 311 expands venue based on
where the claim arose to "a judicial district in which a substantial part of the
events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of prop-
erty that is the subject of the action is situated." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a),(b),(e). It
also creates uniform bases for venue in diversity and federal question cases ex-
cept for a strange disparity in § 1391(a)(3) and (b)(3). 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), (b).
Finally, section 311 defines a corporation's residence by where the corporation is
subject to personal jurisdiction when the action commences. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).
Section 312 limits removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c)(Supp. 1991). Defendants
may now remove cases involving separate and independent claims only in federal
question cases. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c).
280. Federal Courts Study Act, 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1988)(codified as a revision note).
Congress passed the Federal Courts Study Act on November 19, 1988. It became
effective on January 1, 1989. The Act directed the Chief Justice of the United
States to appoint the members of the Federal Courts Study Committee within 10
days of the effective date. Id.
281. See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY ComnTTEE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
STUDY CoMMITTEE 3 (1990).
282. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (Supp. 1991).
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branches of the federal government, state government, and the prac-
ticing bar.2s 3 Over a fifteen-month period, the Committee sought rec-
ommendations from a broad range of interested groups and
organizations, conducted research, solicited comments on proposals,
and held public hearings. The Committee issued its report on April 2,
1990.284
Among the materials upon which the Federal Courts Study Com-
mittee relied were two working reports, one by Professor Richard I.
Marcus2 85 and the other by the Commercial and Federal Litigation
Section of the New York State Bar Association.286 Both reports dis-
cussed the problems with borrowing statutes of limitations for federal
claims. Professor Marcus recommended that Congress supply statutes
of limitations for existing federal statutory claims that lack them. He
also recommended that Congress adopt general fallback statutes of
limitations for nonstatutory federal claims.287
Like Professor Marcus, the New York State Bar Association Sec-
283. The Committee included the Hon. Joseph F. Weis, Jr., Chair, United States Court
of Appeals Judge for the Third Circuit; J. Vincent Aprile II, General Counsel of
the Kentucky State Department of Public Advocacy;, the Hon. Jose' A. Cabranes,
United States District Court Judge for the District of Connecticut; the Hon.
Keith M. Callow, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Washington; the Hon.
Levin H. Campbell, Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit; Edward S.G. Dennis, Jr., Assistant Attorney General for the Crimi-
nal Division of the United States Department of Justice; Charles E. Grassley,
United States Senator from Iowa; Morris Harrell, Partner in the law firm of
Locke, Purnell, Rain, Harrell in Dallas, Texas; Howell T. Heflin, United States
Senator from Alabama; Robert W. Kastenmeier, United States Representative
from Wisconsin; the Hon. Judith N. Keep, United States District Court Judge for
the Southern District of California; Rex E. Lee, Jr., President of Brigham Young
University;, Carlos J. Moorhead, United States Representative from California;
Diana Gribbon Motz, Partner in the law firm of Frank, Bernstein, Conway &
Goldman in Baltimore, Maryland; and the Hon. Richard A. Posner, United States
Court of Appeals Judge for the Seventh Circuit. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COM-
baTEE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY ComnTrEE Part II at 193-96
(1990). For additional biographical information on the Committee members and
the names of the senior staff, reporters, advisors, consultants, and organizations
that contributed to the Committee's work, see id. at 193-203.
284. For discussion on the Committee and its report see generally Gregory E. Maggs,
Reducing the Costs of Statutory Ambiguity: Alternative Approaches and the Fed-
eral Courts Study Committee, 29 HARv. J. ON LEGis. 123,154-70 (1992); William K.
Slate II, Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee: An Update, 21 SEON
HALL L. REv. 336 (1991); ERwin CHEmER INsx, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 1.6, at 3-
8 (1992 Supp.).
285. See Marcus, Memorandum, supra note 1.
286. See NYSBA REPORT, supra note 1.
287. In his cover memorandum Professor Marcus states:
This memorandum proposes that the Federal Courts Study Commit-
tee recommend that Congress (1) establish limitations periods for Con-
gressionally-created federal claims that presently lack such periods, and
(2) adopt fallback limitations periods for those federal claims, such as
claims implied by courts, that Congress did not explicitly create. In addi-
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tion on Commercial and Federal Litigation suggested that Congress
adopt specific statutes of limitations for the major, existing statutory
claims lacking them. The report further recommended enacting a
"catch-all" statute for other federal claims without limitations periods.
Finally, the Section suggested establishing uniform tolling provisions
for federal statutes of limitations.28 8 Recognizing that retroactivity
could be a problem, the report warned, "In enacting federal statutes of
limitations, Congress should address the issue of retroactivity and
should specify an effective date for the application of the enacted limi-
tations periods."289
The Federal Courts Study Committee essentially adopted Profes-
sor Marcus' recommendations. 290 It recommended that Congress en-
act statutes of limitations for the major, existing statutory claims
without limitations periods. The report also stated that Congress
should enact fallback limitations periods for judicially implied claims
and "any other federal claim not specifically covered by a limitations
provision."291 In support of its recommendations, the Committee con-
tion, it would be helpful if a compilation were prepared of the limitations
periods of those federal claims that have them.
Marcus, Memorandum, supra note 1, at 1.
288. Section V of the report states:
This Section recommends that Congress enact express statutes of
limitations for the major federal statutory causes of action that now lack
them. Such causes of action include but are not limited to those in the
areas of federal securities regulation, civil rights and labor law men-
tioned previously in this Report. Congress should also enact a general
"catch-all" statute of limitations to govern all causes of action not other-
wise provided for. Finally, Congress should enact uniform tolling provi-
sions to govern the application of all federal statutes of limitations.
Under current law, the federal courts borrowing and applying state stat-
utes of limitations for federal causes of action frequently borrow the
state tolling rules which extend the limitations periods under certain
specified conditions. In the interest of uniformity, such matter should
not be left to state law.
NYSBA REPORT, supra note 1, at 16.
289. Id. The report concluded that case law could resolve questions of accrual and
survival of actions.
290. The Committee's recommendations on statutes of limitations for federal claims
are found in Chapter 5. This chapter contains the Committee's suggestions to
"reduce unnecessary litigation, to simplify unnecessarily complex litigation, and
to help federal courts process litigation as effectively as possible." FEDERAL
COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY Commr=
89 (1990).
291. The Committee's report states:
Regarding statutes of limitations, Congress should (1) adopt limitations
periods for major congressionally created federal claims that presently
lack such periods, and (2) adopt fallback limitations periods for federal
claims (such as those implied by the courts) not explicitly created by
Congress and for any other federal claim not specifically covered by a
limitations provision. Before the adoption of such legislation, existing
federal statutes of limitations should be surveyed for any guidance they
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cluded that borrowing "appears to lack persuasive support as a matter
of policy."29 2 It also emphasized the practical problems of borrowing
including uncertainty and lack of uniformity.293
Representative Robert Kastenmeier, Chair of the House Judiciary
Committee's Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the
Administration of Justice, had previously introduced a bill in Con-
gress to establish a ten-year fallback statute of limitations for federal
statutes lacking limitations periods.2 94 This provision would have ap-
plied to both existing and prospective federal legislation.2 95 The bill
met with criticism296 and was never acted upon.
Concerned about the effect a general limitations period might have
on existing federal legislation, the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellec-
tual Property, and the Administration of Justice decided to take a
may provide as to lengths of periods for various types of actions, and to
determine whether existing limitations provisions are inconsistent
enough to warrant revision.
Id. at 93. The report also recommends that Congress not abandon the federal
fraudulent concealment doctrine. Id Under statutes of limitations in the "Sum-
mary and Conclusions" section, the report states, "Adopt statutes for major
claims and fall-back limitations for others." Id- at 183.
292. Id. at 93.
293. The Federal Courts Study Committee Report provides in part:
Borrowing, while defensible as a decisional approach in the absence of
legislation, appears to lack persuasive support as a matter of policy. It
also creates several practical problems: It obligates judges and lawyers
to determine the most analogous state law claim; it imposes uncertainty
on litigants; reliance on varying state laws results in undesirable vari-
ance among the federal courts and disrupts the development of federal
doctrine on the suspension of limitations periods. The present approach
may promote uniform limitations periods between related state and fed-
eral claims, but that is a relatively minor benefit, especially given the
uncertainty surrounding which statute will govern and the possibility of
filing in different states with different time periods.
Id
294: H.R. 3553, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 Cong. Rec. H 7835 (1989).
295. The bill provided in relevant part:
Except as otherwise provided by law, a civil action arising under an
Act of Congress may not be commenced later than 10 years after the
cause of action accrues.
... The amendments made by this Act shall take effect 60 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply with respect to
causes of action accruing on or after the date such amendments take
effect.
H.R. 3553, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
296. Interview with Charles Geyh, former counsel to the House Judiciary's Subcom-
mittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and Administration of Justice, in Harris-
burg, Pa. (Sept. 23, 1992). In 1945, Congress also considered a one-year general
statute of limitations; however, one-year was deemed too short for civil rights,
antitrust, and trademark and patent infringement actions. Marcus Memoran-
dum, supra note 1, at 5.
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more cautious approach.297 The Federal Courts Study Committee's
Report recommended doing a survey of existing federal statutes of
limitations before enacting new legislation.29s A survey would provide
guidance for enacting new limitations periods and determining
whether existing periods needed revision.2 9 However, a survey could
not be completed within the time left in the 101st Congress. Rather
than waiting and perhaps losing the momentum for reform,3 00 Repre-
sentatives Kastenmeier and Carlos Moorhead3Ol introduced a second
bill in the House. 302 Section 111 of H.R. 5381 provided a four-year
fallback statute of limitations for claims arising under future federal
legislation.
At the hearings before the House Judiciary Committee's Subcom-
mittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of
Justice,303 the majority of witnesses who commented on the proposed
fallback provision strongly urged that it apply to causes of action aris-
ing under existing federal law as well as future legislation.304 Only
George C. Freeman, Jr., Chair of the American Bar Association Busi-
ness Law Section, argued that it should not be retroactive. He stated
that applying the fallback provision to existing law would upset cer-
297. Interview with Charles Geyh, supra note 296.
298. FEDERAL CouRTs STUDY COMMrrrEE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL CouRTs STUDY
CommrnrEE 93 (1990).
299. Id. See supra note 291.
300. Interview with Charles Geyh, supra note 296.
301. Representative Moorhead was the ranking minority member of the Subcommit-
tee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice.
302. H.R. 5381, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 112 (1990). H.R. 5381 was introduced on July 26,
1990.
303. Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act and Civil Justice Reform
Act Hearing on H.R 5381 and H. 3898 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intel-
lectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the House of Representa-
tives Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990)[hereinafter Hearing].
The hearing was held on September 6, 1990.
304. Those recommending retroactivity included the Hon. Deanell R. Tacha, United
States Court of Appeals Judge for the Tenth Circuit and Chair of the Judicial
Conference Committee on the Judicial Branch, id. at 146, and Alan B. Morrison,
Director of the Public Citizen Litigation Group, id. at 224. Assistant Attorney
General Stuart Gerson, representing the United States Department of Justice,
also urged that the general statute of limitations be retroactive as applied to pri-
vate citizens but that no limitations period apply to suits brought by the United
States. Id. at 184, 198. The Hon. Joseph F. Weis, Jr., United States Court of Ap-
peals Judge for the Third Circuit and Chair of the Federal Courts Study Commit-
tee, stated that the prospective statute of limitations was a "good start" but
expressed concern that Congress not delay enacting specific statutes of limita-
tions for existing federal claims. Id. at 92. Robert M. Landis, Former Chair of the
ABA Standing Committee on Federal Judicial Improvements, did not discuss the
retroactivity issue. He testified that the ABA had not formulated a policy on the
proposal but indicated that the Standing Committee on Federal Judicial Improve-
ments approved of reducing the proposed limitations period from 10 to four years.
Id at 242.
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tainty and predictability. 05
Whether a statute should be retroactive raises fairness concerns.
As discussed in Part Im, a new, retroactive time-bar may unfairly sur-
prise actual and potential litigants. 06 However, Mr. Freeman's rea-
soning presents a false dichotomy. He apparently assumed that a
general statute of limitations would be either absolutely prospective
or absolutely retroactive. If it were absolutely prospective, the new
time period would apply only to statutes enacted after the fallback
statute was enactedSo7 If it were absolutely retroactive, the new pe-
riod would apply to all claims arising under existing and future federal
law, regardless of when the claim accrued. However, a third possibil-
ity exists, limited retroactivity. The general limitations period could
apply to both existing and prospective federal law but only to those
claims accruing after the limitations statute was enacted.
Except for the retroactivity issue, the proposed statute of limita-
tions generated little criticism.3 03 The Subcommittee decided to rec-
ommend the prospective limitations period to the House Judiciary
Committee; the Committee staff would then commission a survey of
existing federal statutes of limitations the following year.3 09 Once the
survey was completed, the Subcommittee could reconsider what
should be done about the existing federal statutes that lacked explicit
time-bars.310 The House Judiciary Committee favorably reported
H.R. 5381 to the full House on September 18, 1990.311
305. Id. at 246. Mr. Freeman's testified as follows:
We strongly urge you to not make it [the federal statute of limita-
tions] retroactive. The very reasons for having a uniform Federal statute
of limitations where none is presently specified is to provide certainty
and predictability. But making it retroactive is counter to those very
principles.
Our section of the association has been deeply disturbed by the grow-
ing trend in recent years to make legislation and regulation retroactive.
Prior to 20 years ago no statute in the United States nor any regulation
was retroactive. That was because we have a great common law tradi-
tion in this country that goes back even before our Constitution of not
having retroactive legislation. It was anathema to the common law, and
the reason it was anathema was because the law was normally based on
the theory that a person ought to know what the law is and conform his
conduct to it accordingly.
So we strongly urge you not to make it retroactive.
Id.
306. See supma text accompanying notes 130-40.
307. Of course, Congress could make the new statute retroactive, which would not
solve Mr. Freeman's problem.
308. Interview with Charles Geyh, supra note 296.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-734, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, 6861. The Senate did not draft a separate bill. Instead, it
adopted H.R. 5381 as an amendment to S. 2648. See 136 Cong. Rec. S17583 (daily
ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
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Congress subsequently passed H.R. 5381 as Title III of the Judicial
Improvements Act of 1990, which the President signed into law on De-
cember 1, 1990. A survey of federal limitations periods has been com-
pleted.312 As of this writing, however, Congress has provided neither
specific nor general statutes of limitations for those causes of action,
without explicit time-bars, which arise under federal law existing on
or before December 1, 1990.
V. 28 U.S.C. § 1658
A. Prospective Legislation
Section 313 of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 establishes a
general fallback statute of limitations for civil claims arising under
federal legislation enacted after December 1, 1990.313 A plaintiff must
commence his or her action no later than four years after the claim
accrues. Section 313 applies only to Congressional legislation passed
after December 1, 1990. It does not apply to federal statutory claims
with explicit limitations periods, federal acts effective on or before De-
cember 1, 1990, criminal legislation,31 4 or claims arising under federal
common law. Whether section 313 applies to causes of action implied
under federal statutes enacted after December 1, 1990, is unclear. 315
Congress enacted section 313 in response to the "practical"
problems which borrowing creates for judges and litigators. The
House Report accompanying section 313316 quotes directly from the
Federal Courts Study Committee Report. It emphasizes that borrow-
ing "obligates judges and lawyers to determine the most analogous
state law claim; it imposes uncertainty on litigants; reliance on varying
state laws results in undesirable variances among the federal courts
and disrupts the development of federal doctrine on the suspension of
limitation periods."317 The Report states that the fallback statute is
designed to address these problems.318
No general fallback period of limitations would be ideal for every
312. Interview with Charles Geyh, former counsel to the House Judiciary Commit-
tee's Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and Administration of Jus-
tice, in Harrisburg, Pa. (Sept. 25, 1992).
313. Section 313 provides in relevant part: Except as otherwise provided by law, a civil
action arising under an Act of Congress enacted after the date of the enactment
of this section may not be commenced later than 4 years after the cause of action
accrues. 28 U.S.C. § 1658.
314. Congress has enacted a five-year fallback statute of limitations for non-capital
criminal actions. 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1988).
315. See inkfra text accompanying notes 328-30.






claim. A cursory look at existing federal statutes of limitations319 sug-
gests that four years may be somewhat long. For example, causes of
action which resemble traditional personal injury actions generally
have shorter time-bars. 2 0 However, many federal limitations provi-
sions are four or more years. For example, actions involving contrac-
tual or commercial rights, fraud, or government enforcement tend to
have longer statutes of limitations.321 Because Congress is free to en-
act a shorter time-bar when creating a new cause of action, the
fallback limitations period should err in favor of plaintiffs.
Four years is a reasonable compromise, at least for prospective
causes of action. Plaintiffs and their attorneys have substantial time
to discover, investigate,3 2 2 and assert most claims. Moreover, four
years does not seem to be an unreasonably long time to hold potential
defendants liable for most past actions. Where four years is either too
long or too short, Congress is free to enact a different statute of limita-
tions for that particular cause of action. In fact, the most important
function which Section 313 may serve is to put Congress on notice.
Congress must now specify a different limitations period in the lan-
guage of a new statute if it does not want section 313 to apply. Accord-
ingly, section 313 should induce Congress to pay more attention to
what the limitations period should be and engage in the proper balanc-
319. For a discussion of some of the states' general statutes of limitations see infra
notes 344, 353, 354, 368 and accompanying text.
320. See ag., 5 U.S.C. § 8122(a)(1988)(providing a three-year limitations period to re.
cover under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act); 46 U.S.C. § 763a
(1988) (providing a three-year limitations period for personal injury or death from
maritime torts); 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1988)(providing a one-year limitations period
for neglecting to prevent a conspiracy to interfere with civil rights); 45 U.S.C. § 56
(1988)(providing a three-year limitations period to recover for personal injury
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act). Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (1988)(provid-
ing a two-year limitations period for presenting tort claims against the United
States to the appropriate federal agency).
321. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(b)(4)(1988)(providing a five-year limitations period for
insider trading); 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (1988) (providing a six-year general statute of
limitations for nontort actions against the United States); 28 U.S.C.
§ 2415(a)(1988)(providing a six-year limitations period for contract actions
brought by the United States); 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1988)(providing a five-year gen-
eral limitations period for government enforcement of a civil fine, penalty, or
forfeiture); 35 U.S.C. § 286 (1988)(providing a six-year limitations period for pat-
ent infringement); 38 U.S.C. § 1984(b)(1988) (providing a six-year limitations pe-
ried for claiming benefits under United States Government Life Insurance or
National Service Life Insurance); 41 U.S.C. § 604 (1988)(providing a six-year limi-
tations period for government actions against a public contractor for misrepresen-
tation or fraud against the United States). Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 15(b)(1988)(providing a
four-year limitations period for civil enforcement actions under the Clayton Act).
But see 17 U.S.C. § 507(b)(1988)(providing a three-year limitations period for
copyright infringement).
322. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 mandates that a reasonable inquiry be made
into both the facts and the law before a complaint is filed. See supra note 53.
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ing of interests. Unfortunately, the opposite may prove to be true.
Knowing that a fallback period already exists, Congress may be even
less inclined to worry about appropriate statutes of limitations when
writing new law.X
Section 313 also eliminates the problem of borrowing state tolling
provisions for new federal legislation. State tolling law does not apply
to federal claims with explicit statutes of limitations because Con-
gress' intent to create a uniform limitations period for a particular fed-
eral right would be thwarted. 24 Rather, the courts apply federal
tolling principles, usually developed through common law.3 25
Although section 313 does not expressly address tolling, it now pro-
vides an explicit federal statute of limitations for new causes of action
which lack them. Therefore, only federal tolling principles should ap-
ply. The House Report supports this conclusion.326 Moreover, bor-
rowing the states' tolling laws would controvert Congress' intent to
provide a uniform limitations period for prospective federal legisla-
tion. As a result, courts and litigants will no longer have to search
state law to determine what tolling provisions might govern, but must
look only to federal law. More importantly, uniform tolling principles
will apply to new federal claims instead of varying from state to
state.3 27
323. See Maggs, supra note 284, at 160. Section 102 of the 1991 Civil Rights Act ap-
pears to be an example of Congress' continuing neglect. Section 102 provides
damages for intentional discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), and the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. 1991). In creating a damage remedy Con-
gress did not amend the anti-discrimination statutes. Instead, it codified section
102 as a separate statute. Id. Because section 102 does not contain a statute of
limitations, the four-year fallback limitations period should apply. This would
impose an four-year outside statute of limitations on damage claims under the
Title VII, ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act where none has previously existed.
Moreover, the four-year fallback statute of limitations would not affect claims for
equitable relief under the same statutes. It is doubtful that Congress intended
this result. In fact, in the 1991 Civil Rights Act Congress expressly eliminated a
two-year outside statute of limitations governing claims under the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act (ADEA) to conform ADEA filing procedures with
Title VII. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 115, 105 Stat. 1071, 1079 (1991). See 137 Cong.
Rec. H9548 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991).
324. See Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424,433 (1965); Siegel, Practice
Commentary, supra note 1, at 100.
325. See supra text accompanying notes 39-40.
326. See H.R. REP. No. 101-734, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 24, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6860, 6870 stating that borrowing "disrupts the development of federal doctrine
on the suspension of limitation periods").
327. Different tolling rules may develop for different causes of action. However, the
same principles will apply throughout the country to the same right.
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B. Implied Causes of Action
Section 313 does not apply to causes of action implied under federal
statutes enacted on or before December 1, 1990, or implied under the
Constitution. Whether the fallback provision applies to causes of ac-
tion implied under federal statutes enacted after December 1, 1990, is
unclear. The language of section 313 refers to civil actions "arising
under" acts of Congress. When the courts recognize an implied right
of action, the claim is implied from the statutory language and in-
tent.3 28 The implied claim can be said to "arise under" that statute.
Accordingly, the courts may assume that Congress intends them to
apply section 313.
However, Congress cannot intend that a particular period apply if
Congress is not aware that the right exists when it enacts the stat-
ute.329 If the statute contains an analogous cause of action with an
explicit limitations period, the courts may assume that Congress in-
tended for that limitations period to govern the implied right, pursu-
ant to the rule in Gilbertson. Otherwise, the courts must borrow state
law.33 0 Unfortunately, Congress left this issue for the courts to
resolve.
C. Pre-Act Legislation and Federal Common Law Actions
Section 313 addresses only a small portion of the "borrowing prob-
lem" because it is limited to new federal statutes. Courts must still
borrow statutes of limitations for all federal claims without explicit
limitations provisions arising or implied under statutes enacted on or
before December 1, 1990. Borrowing also applies to federal common
law claims. The length of time in which litigants may assert their fed-
eral rights, including their constitutional rights, will continue to vary
from state to state, and even within some states, according to which
statutes of limitations the courts borrow. Courts and litigants will
continue spending valuable time and resources researching and litigat-
ing limitations issues. Litigants will also continue shopping for juris-
dictions with the longest limitations period, placing an undue burden
on certain jurisdictions and unnecessarily inconveniencing defendants
and witnesses. All of the problems which induced Congress to enact a
fallback statute of limitations thus remain for the vast majority of fed-
eral claims which currently lack explicit limitations provisions.3 31
The legislative history indicates that Congress did not make section
328. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
329. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2783
(1991)(Scalia, J., concurring in part and in judgment). But see Cannon v. Univer-
sity of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 718 (1979)(Retnquist, J., concurring).
330. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2780
(1991).
331. See N.Y. ST. L. DIG., supra note 8, at 2 (stating that "it will probably take a gener-
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313 retroactive because it was afraid to disrupt numerous court deci-
sions which have adopted limitations periods for existing federal legis-
lation.3 3 2 Citing George Freeman's hearing testimony, the House
Report states that making section 313 retroactive would "threaten to
disrupt the settled expectations of a great many parties."3 3 3 Ironi-
cally, it is the current system of borrowing which prevents predictabil-
ity and equity.3 4 As the Supreme Court's decision in Gilbertson
demonstrates, borrowing can resemble a game of Russian roulette.
Even when the statute of limitations appears to be settled in a particu-
lar district or circuit, the plaintiff may suddenly find him or herself
barred from the courthouse door, or the defendant find him or herself
liable on a presumably stale claim.333
Congress could easily have made section 313 retroactive without
unfairly surprising litigants. Congress merely had to word section 313
so that it applied to all federal claims lacking explicit limitations peri-
ods which accrued after the effective date of the Act. The falback
statute would not have affected pending claims, and the passage of the
statute would have given prospective litigants sufficient notice of the
new limitations period. If Congress felt that more notice was neces-
sary, it could have chosen a subsequent accrual date.336
Congress intended the Federal Courts Study Committee Imple-
mentation Act to enact some of the Federal Courts Study Committee's
"noncontroversial recommendations."3 3 7 More controversial reforms
were left for later consideration. Congress' real concern seems to have
been that applying a four-year fallback statute retroactively would ex-
pand or contract existing, court-imposed limitations periods.338 This
would probably generate at least some controversy. The House Re-
ation, if not a century or more, for such (future] claims to approach the mass
already recognized in federal law and to which § 1658 does not apply").
332. H.R. REP. No. 101-734, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, 6870.
333. Id.
334. See supra Part III. See also N.Y. ST. L. DIG., supra note 8, at 1 ("In other words,
the very quantum of cases that manifest the need for a cure are cited as a reason
for not offering it!").
335. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, Ill S. Ct. 2773, 2785-
86 (1991)(O'Connor, J., dissenting); discussion supra text accompanying notes
130-40.
336. H.R. 3553, which proposed a ten-year fallback statute of limitations, contained
appropriate language limiting the bill's retroactive effect to prospective claims.
See supra note 295.
337. H.R. Rep. No. 101-734, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6860, 6861.
338. See id. at 24, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6870 (stating that "retroactively
imposing a four year statute of limitations on legislation that the courts have pre-
viously ruled is subject to a six month limitations period in one statute, and a ten
year period in another, would threaten to disrupt the settled expectations of a
great many parties").
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port states that "the Committee was reluctant to apply this section
[313] retroactively without further study to ensure that the benefits of
retroactive application would indeed outweigh the costs."33 9
Applying a four-year time-bar to pre-Act federal actions would, in
fact, lengthen many court-imposed limitations periods.40 Had Con-
gress made section 313 retroactive, section 313 might have been viewed
as a boon to plaintiffs. Indeed, defendants' bar might prefer having
the courts continue borrowing statutes of limitations. Although the
Supreme Court has not necessarily picked the shortest available limi-
tations period, it generally does not borrow a long analog. For exam-
ple, before United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell 34 and DelCostello v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters,42 a number of courts bor-
rowed the states' contract time-bars for hybrid § 301/fair representa-
tion labor claims.3 43 The states' statutes of limitations for contract
actions tend to be relatively long, often six or more years. 4 Other
courts borrowed the states' arbitration time-bars, which are usually
measured in months.3 45 In DelCostello, the Supreme Court held that a
three-month arbitration statute of limitations was inappropriate for
hybrid labor actions.34 6 However, the Court also rejected the state's
six-year contract 347 and three-year malpractice limitations periods.348
Instead, the Supreme Court borrowed a six-month time-bar from the
National Labor Relations Act.349 Similarly, in Gilbertson the
Supreme Court rejected the five-year statute of limitations governing
insider trading claims, as well as the states' "blue sky" and fraud stat-
339. Id.
340. See, e.g., Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773
(1991) (applying a one-and-three year limitations period to securities fraud actions
implied under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act); Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S.
235 (1989)(applying the state's general or residual limitations period to § 1983 ac-
tions); DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983)(apply-
ing a six-month limitations period to hybrid § 301/fair representation labor
actions).
341. 451 U.S. 56 (1981).
342. 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
343. See, eg., Butler v. Teamsters Local 823, 514 F.2d 442 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 423
U.S. 924 (1975); Abrams v. Carrier Corp., 434 F.2d 1234, 1252-53 (2d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1009 (1971).
344. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-2-33(1)(1975)(10 years); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 413.090(2)(Mchie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992)(15 years for written contracts); MCH.
COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.5807(8)(West 1987)(six years); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R.
213(2)(McKinney 1990)(six years); O. Rsv. STAT. § 12.080(1)(1991)(six years).
345. See DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 155, 166 & n.15
(1983).
346. Id. at 166-67.
347. See id. at 165-66.
348. Id. at 168-69.
349. Id. at 155.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
utes of limitations.350 The Court held that securities fraud claims
under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act must be brought within
one year of discovering a violation, but no later than three years from
the date of the violation.3 5 '
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has characterized most civil
rights claims as personal injury claims for purposes of borrowing the
most analogous state statute of limitations.352 Although the states'
general personal injury statutes vary from one to six years, the major-
ity are two or three years.35 3 Only five states have personal injury
periods of four or more years.3 54 A four-year fallback statute of limi-
tations would thus expand the limitations period for most civil rights
claims and some analogous claims.3 55 There is also some indication
that states which have traditionally had longer personal injury stat-
utes of limitations may be shortening them. For example, New Hamp-
shire has reduced its six-year statute to three years.3 5 6 With the
current impetus for tort reform and a more conservative bench as a
result of the Reagan/Bush judicial appointments, defendants' bar may
well prefer borrowing time-bars for existing federal causes of action
rather than risking a Congressionally imposed, general time-bar.
Nevertheless, Congress should have risked potential controversy
and made Section 313 retroactive. The uncertainty, inequity, and
waste of resources under the current system of borrowing outweighs
the problems that a four-year limitations period might cause for par-
ticular causes of action. In most instances four years would not un-
duly prejudice either plaintiffs or defendants, and Congress would
350. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2777-78
& n.1, 2781 (1991).
351. Id. at 2782. The Supreme Court also rejected a one-and-two-year period. Id. at
2780 n.5.
352. See Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989)(§ 1983 claims); Goodman v. Lukens Steel
Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987)(§ 1981 claims); McSurely v. Hutchinson, 823 F.2d 1002
(6th Cir. 1987)(Bivens actions), cert. denied, 485 U.S. U.S. 934 (1988).
353. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-542(1)(1992)(two years); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-80-102(1)(a)(1989)(two years); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 260, § 2A (West
Supp. 1992)(three years); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5805(8)(West Supp.
1992)(three years); N.Y. CIv. PRAc. L. & R. § 214(5)(McKinney 1990)(three
years); ORIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2305-10 (Anderson 1991)(two years); OIL REV.
STAT. § 12.110(1)(1991)(two years); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-243(A)(Michie
1992)(two years); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.54(1)(West 1983)(three years).
354. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(3)(a)(West 1982)(four years); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,
§ 752 (West 1980)(six years); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 516.120(4)(Vernon 1952)(five
years); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-16(5)(1991)(six years); WYO. STAT. § 1-3-
105(a) (iv) (C) (1988) (four years).
355. See e.g., Reed v. United Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319 (1989)(borrowing the state's
general personal injury statute of limitations for a violation of a union member's
right of free speech under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act).
356. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:4(I)(1992 Supp.)(eff. July 1, 1986).
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remain free to supply a different limitations period for those cases
where four years did prove to be inappropriate.
Moreover, restricting section 313 to prospective legislation may fur-
ther complicate the borrowing process for claims arising under ex-
isting federal law. Arguably, section 313 can be viewed as a general
policy statement that four years should govern federal claims when
Congress is silent.357 Section 313 may thus provide yet another analog
which courts and litigants must consider when borrowing the most
analogous limitations period for pre-Act actions.
The most significant problem which section 313 may pose, how-
ever, is that it may lull Congress into inaction. Statutes of limitations
generate little political interest. Having addressed part of the prob-
lem, Congress may feel little compulsion to supply either a general
limitations period or specific time-bars for all of the federal causes of
action existing on or before December 1, 1990, which lack statutes of
limitations.
D. Options for Reform
Congress should amend Section 313 to deal with existing federal
claims which do not have explicit statutes of limitations, including im-
plied and federal common law claims. Several options are available.
The Federal Courts Study Committee recommended that Congress
provide specific statutes of limitations for existing federal claims. 5 8 It
also recommended that Congress enact fallback time-bars for implied
claims and any other federal claims without explicit limitations peri-
ods.359 The survey of existing federal statutes of limitations which the
Report suggested has been completedSSO and could be used to assist
Congress.
Theoretically, the Committee's recommendations provide the best
solution. To enact a statute of limitations for each existing claim, Con-
gress would have to balance the interests pertaining to the particular
federal right in question. This is the very balancing that Congress
should have done in the first place.
However, the Committee's approach is impractical because it over-
simplifies the legislative process. Hundreds of federal causes of action
without explicit time-bars may exist. Identifying all of them, while
possible, would be both difficult and time-consuming. Congress would
then have to select an appropriate time-bar for each cause of action as
well as enacting a fallback statute of limitations for implied and com-
357. N.Y. ST. L. DiG., supm note 8, at 2.
358. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY ComnrrEE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
CohMzrEE at 93 (1990).
359. Id
360. Interview with Charles Geyh, supra note 312.
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mon law claims. This process would be much more controversial and
time-consuming than enacting one general limitations period. Con-
gress' busy agenda and the lack of political interest in statutes of limi-
tations make it unlikely that Congress will supply separate limitations
provisions for existing federal claims, at least not in the foreseeable
future.36 1
Congress could also enact statutes of limitations for general catego-
ries of federal claims, similar to the states' practice. This approach
would be an improvement over the current system of borrowing.
However, Congress would have to agree on the categories and the ap-
propriate limitations period for each category. States generally char-
acterize claims by common law causes of action. However, federal
causes of action are not necessarily comparable to common law catego-
ries, and those that are may be analogous to more than one common
law action.36 2 Some federal claims would arguably fall within more
than one general category which would generate litigation and dis-
putes among the courts.
Finally, Congress could amend section 313 to apply to all federal
claims without explicit time-bars. Enacting a comprehensive "catch-
all" statute of limitations would be the easiest and most practical solu-
tion to the problem. By wording the statute so that it applied only to
claims accruing after the statute's enactment date, Congress would
avoid unfair surprise to litigants. A simple answer to criticism that
applying section 313 retroactively would favor plaintiffs is that Con-
gress could choose a shorter limitations period. However, a compre-
hensive fallback provision would govern a number of important
federal rights which embody a strong public policy in favor of having
these rights asserted. These would include constitutional, discrimina-
tion, and environmental enforcement claims. Accordingly, Congress
should choose a longer limitations period over a shorter one.
Four years would probably be an appropriate compromise for
claims arising under existing federal law, as well as prospective legis-
lation. The courts have generally borrowed state statutes of limita-
tions, frequently the states' general personal injury,363 contracts,36 4 or
361. See M. Patrick McDowell, Limitation Periods for Federal Causes of Action After
the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990,44 VAND. L. REV. 1355, 1372-86 (1991)(rec-
ommending that Congress delegate the power to adopt specific limitations periods
to the Judicial Conference or a commission or else establish a study committee to
recommend specific statutes of limitations).
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fraud3 65 provisions. The majority of the states' general personal in-
jury statutes of limitations are somewhat shorter than four years, usu-
ally two or three years.3 66 However, their general contract statutes
tend to be longer, often six or more years.3 67 Many of the states' stat-
utes of limitations for fraud are also four or more years.36 8 Because a
comprehensive fallback statute would apply to many different types of
actions, it should not be unduly restrictive. In some instances, a four-
year limitations period might also alleviate existing prejudice to plain-
tiffs where the courts have borrowed a particularly short period of
limitations.369
Although four years would not be suitable for some causes of ac-
tion, such cases should be relatively rare. Moreover, once a compre-
hensive fallback statute of limitations took effect, special interest
groups would likely identify specific problem areas and pressure Con-
gress into providing more appropriate time-bars where needed. Con-
gress is more likely to address a few causes of action under pressure
than it is to enact specific statutes of limitations for every federal
cause of action which currently lacks a limitations period.
E. Additional Considerations
In amending Section 313, Congress should also address several re-
lated problems. During the hearings, the Justice Department urged
Congress to exempt the United States from the fallback statute of lim-
itations when the government acts as a plaintiff.3 70 Although a blan-
ket exemption would be inappropriate, a limited exemption might
have merit in particular areas. Effective enforcement and deterrence
may require greater flexibility where the United States is suing to en-
force environmental or employment anti-discrimination laws.3 71 For
example, a statute of limitations might prevent the EEOC from effec-
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tively enforcing the nation's laws prohibiting employment discrimina-
tion because of the Agency's backlog of cases. Congress would need to
clarify this issue.
Confusion might also arise over whether a comprehensive fallback
statute of limitations would supercede other general limitations provi-
sions. In particular, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 directs the courts to apply state
law to supplement civil rights actions unless state law would be incon-
sistent with the Constitution or laws of the United States.372 Congress
would need to specify whether the new fallback statute or 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988 governed civil rights claims.373
As a general rule of construction, a more specific statute will apply
over a general statute. Arguably, a federal fallback statute of limita-
tions would be more specific than § 1988 because it would deal directly
with statutes of limitations for federal claims without them. Section
1988 addresses statutory "gaps" in general. A federal fallback statute
of limitations would close the limitations gap.
Policy also suggests that the federal fallback statute would govern
civil rights actions. The current system of borrowing state law creates
inequity in enforcing federal civil rights because the time in which to
assert a right varies from state to state. Applying a federal time-bar
would eliminate that inequity by creating a uniform limitations pe-
Furthermore, there are certain types of actions for which there is
currently no limitations period applicable to the government and for
which no statute of limitation is appropriate. For, example, there is no
limitations period applicable to abatement actions under § 106 of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1988).
The government's ability to clean up sites presenting an imminent
and substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare should not
be curtailed by litigation over whether the cause of action arose when
the release of a hazardous substance occurred, when it was discovered, or
when the endangerment was determined. Nor should such actions be
barred because a dangerous condition may have been in existence more
than four years before the action was filed.
Id at 199.
372. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. 1991) provides in part:
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the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal
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courts in the trial and disposition of the cause ....
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riod. Borrowing a state time-bar would thus be inconsistent with the
purpose of the fallback statute, and by its own terms, § 1988 would not
apply.
Nevertheless, § 1988 might be deemed the more specific statute. It
applies specifically to civil rights actions and expresses Congress' in-
tent that state law should supply missing provisions including limita-
tions periods. A federal fallback statute of limitations would only
apply where Congress had not supplied a limitations period. One
could argue that § 1988 supplies a state time-bar for civil rights claims.
To avoid litigation over this issue, Congress would need to clearly state
that the new fallback statute of limitations governed civil rights ac-
tions under Title 42.374
VI. CONCLUSION
Statutes of limitations are not mere technicalities that can be ig-
nored. They are a vital part of the underlying cause of action. Limita-
tions periods determine the length of time that a plaintiff has to assert
his or her claim, provide defendants with repose from stale claims, and
help preserve both the accuracy and legitimacy of the judicial process.
The Supreme Court has called them "fundamental to a well-ordered
judicial system."375
The proper balancing of these interests is a legislative function, not
one that should be forced upon the courts. Unfortunately, Congress
tends to ignore limitations issues when enacting new federal rights.
As a result, Congress has created numerous federal causes of action
without explicit statutes of limitations. The courts must supply limita-
tions periods for these actions by borrowing the most analogous state,
or occasionally federal, time-bar. Borrowing, however, has generated
uncertainty for litigants and the judiciary, inequitable administration
of federal rights, and needless waste of resources.
Congress finally addressed part of the problem by enacting section
313 of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990. Section 313 establishes
a four-year, prospective fallback statute of limitations. Unfortunately,
section 313 applies only to federal legislation passed after December 1,
374. The general statutes of limitations which provide a specific federal limitations
period for specific types of actions should not present the same problem. For
example, 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a)(1988) provides a six-year statute of limitations for
nontort actions against the United States. Section 2401(a) would apply over the
general fallback statute because it would be the more specific statute. See also 28
U.S.C. § 2415 (1988)(providing a six-year limitations period for contract actions
brought by the United States); 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1988)(providing a five-year gen-
eral limitations period for government enforcement of a civil fine, penalty, or
forfeiture).
375. Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 487 (1980).
1993]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
1990. As a result, the majority of federal claims which lack statutes of
limitations are still subject to the borrowing process and its problems.
Today, there is a strong demand to reduce congestion and ineffi-
ciency in the federal courts. Providing a comprehensive fallback stat-
ute of limitations for all federal claims which lack a limitations period
would be a simple, relatively cost-free way to eliminate at least one
source of inefficiency and congestion. A comprehensive fallback pro-
vision, applicable to claims accruing after the act's effective date,
would provide a clear, easy-to-use rule for both litigants and the
courts. More importantly, it would create uniformity. Plaintiffs' im-
portant federal rights and defendants' liability under the law would no
longer vary from state to state and circuit to circuit, depending on
which limitations period the courts borrow.
The survey of existing federal statutes of limitations which the
Federal Courts Study Committee recommended has been completed
and submitted to Congress. Congress must now complete the task
that it began with section 313. It should enact a comprehensive
fallback statute of limitations which will apply to both existing and
prospective federal causes of action, including implied and federal
common law claims. Hopefully, Congress will address this issue in the
near future.
Finally, a fallback provision should not serve as a substitute for
enacting specific statutes of limitations in the future. Congress must
stop ignoring limitations issues when enacting new law and provide
specific periods of limitations which reflect the appropriate balancing
of interests for the rights created.
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